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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article proposes a marriage or integration of two seemingly 
parallel economic and monetary spheres. These include first, the 
crypto-economy (which has sometimes been described as a sphere of 
economic and monetary activities that lies beyond the rule of law or 
reflecting a novel type of capitalism unshackled from current 
institutions), and second, the role of central banks, in particular the 
European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”). It argues that the 
crypto-economy can benefit from engaging with a programmable 
central bank digital euro, and that the ESCB would also benefit from 
being able to test a limited rollout of the central bank digital euro in 
the crypto-economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An unregulated but thriving space, often known as the “crypto-
economy,”1 is increasingly populated with “decentralized application” 
(“dApp”) business developers innovating to promote peer-to-peer 
commerce supported by blockchain infrastructure.2 The economic 
potential of the dApp economy can be mobilized with institutional 
 
1.  See generally ANDREW ROMANS, MASTERS OF BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL 
COIN OFFERINGS (2018). 
2. This is a type of distributed ledger built by appending blocks of data to form 
one complete ledger shared amongst all nodes. See generally MICHÈLE FINCK, 
BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE (2018). 
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support. This Article argues that support from the public sector can be 
beneficial and mobilizing, drawing upon the framework of regulatory 
capitalism.3 We propose an integration of the dApp economy (which 
has sometimes been described as a sphere of economic and monetary 
activities that lies beyond the rule of law4 or reflecting a novel type of 
capitalism unshackled from current institutions),5 and the role of 
central banks, specifically the European System of Central Banks 
(“ESCB”). We focus on a particular starting point, that is, an 
enabling6 legal framework for the dApp economy anchored upon the 
provision of a digital fiat currency issued by a central bank for 
investment. 
This Article argues that central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) 
could be targeted at the dApp economy as a “limited rollout” for 
primary investment purposes. The CBDC has been discussed 
predominantly in relation to mainstream economic and financial 
activities, but challenges are recognized for its rollout as replacement 
for the physical circulation of cash. A limited rollout provides an 
experimental space for central banks and dApp economy developers, 
bridging a new technologically-developed economic space with a 
public sector institution of old. This Article suggests that the limited 
rollout can be tried in the European context, as the euro, being a 
common currency of the euro area, provides an excellent starting point 
for the building out of the dApp economy, which is generally regarded 
as borderless and global. Further, European policy-making is situated 
within an institutional framework that promotes the building of a 
Single Market for the European economy,7 providing a leadership 
 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. Thibault Schrepel, Anarchy, State, and Blockchain Utopia: Rule of Law 
versus Lex Cryptographia, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DIGITALISATION (Hart 
Publishing 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3485436. 
5. John Flood & Lachlan Robb, Trust, Anarcho-Capitalism, Blockchain and 
Initial Coin Offerings (Griffith U. L. Sch. Research Paper No. 17–23, U. 
Westminster Sch. L. Research Paper, 2017),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=3074263. 
6. Regulation enables economic activities to be carried out, organized, and 
legitimized. See generally Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 
1 (2012). 
7. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 26, 2012/C 236/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT. 
3
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example of policy-making across borders and boundaries amongst 
tightly-coupled economies. This discussion also provides relevant 
insights for the United States. For the United States, the central bank 
digital dollar can provide a starting point for mobilizing the dApp 
economy, and leverage upon its still-accepted status as the global 
reserve currency.8 The central bank digital dollar could also facilitate 
the building out of a federal framework for governing key aspects of 
the dApp economy, such as payment business regulation, securities 
and fundraising regulations, as well as exchange and market 
regulations. These aspects will be mapped out in the European 
example in Part III of this Article. Although this Article chooses to 
discuss the central bank digital euro in detail as the example for 
implementation of the CBDC for the dApp economy, the progression 
of the Article in relation to the development of the dApp economy, its 
market failures, and the role of a CBDC are generally applicable for 
policy thinking whether in Europe or beyond. 
Part I provides a review of current policy thinking on the CBDC 
to be used in the mainstream economy. It is observed that central 
banks have moved from the “research” phase for digital currencies to 
a phase for exploring operationalization, despite the many challenges 
that were canvassed in the research phase not definitely addressed. 
Central banks seem intent on targeting CBDC for mainstream e-
commerce, and possibly global trade and retail.9 However, this Article 
urges central banks to consider aiming an experimental rollout of 
CBDC at the dApp economy in order to test demand, and the 
efficiency and security of its workings. Such a limited proposal is 
based on a win-win agenda for both central banks and developers in 
the dApp economy. Moreover, the genesis for central bankers’ interest 
in CBDC lies in the rise of cryptocurrencies that serve payment and 
other transactional functions in the dApp economy.10 
 
8. Kimberly Amadeo, Why the US Dollar Is the Global Currency, BALANCE 
(July 23, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/world-currency-3305931. 
9. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES: 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND CORE FEATURES (2020), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp33.htm [hereinafter BIS]. 
10. Dirk Bullman, Jonas Klemm & Andrea Pinna, In Search for Stability in 
Crypto-assets: Are Stablecoins the Solution? (ECB Occasional Paper No. 230, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3444847. 
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Part II explains why the CBDC is especially relevant to the dApp 
economy. It discusses the market failures of self-governing solutions 
in the dApp economy—including reliance on private 
cryptocurrencies—and argues that a public sector solution in the form 
of CBDC can be enabling in nature. This Article also provides a 
survey of stablecoin developments and the landscape of risks 
surrounding them in relation to their currency functions in the dApp 
economy. The Article theoretically locates the issuance of CBDC for 
the dApp economy within the paradigm of regulatory capitalism and 
argues that this paradigm allows us to see how CBDC can play a key 
facilitative role in mobilizing the dApp economy for the benefit of 
mainstream users at scale. Part II argues that the CBDC is a public 
sector solution of an enabling nature, which is beneficial for 
mobilizing the dApp economy as a capitalist and governed order. 
Finally, Part III explores how such CBDC should be issued and 
the implications for the institutional frameworks for governing the 
dApp economy. Part III discusses, using the central bank digital euro 
as an example, how a CBDC can be rolled out in an experimental 
manner in a regional market. As the CBDC would be an enabling or 
empowering institution for access to and mobilization of money, it 
paves the way for investment into the dApp economy in a manner 
consistent with institutional trust for a governed market order. It also 
paves the way for a blueprint for the broader institutional implications 
of governing the dApp economy, which can be a new and promising 
space for economic and financial mobilization. These insights, based 
on the experimental central bank digital euro, are potentially useful for 
global policy thinking. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY THINKING ON CENTRAL BANK  
DIGITAL CURRENCIES 
A first question that may be asked in relation to CBDCs is 
whether they are needed at all. Privately-created money dominates 
money supply11 in many developed economies and electronic forms of 
money transfer and payment have evolved from decades ago. The 
digitalization of payment currency has developed over time, from 
 
11. See generally MARY MELLOR, THE FUTURE OF MONEY: FROM FINANCIAL 
CRISIS TO PUBLIC RESOURCE (2010). 
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payment cards to user-friendly forms of payment led by financial 
technologies (“fintechs”) in e-commerce and cashless real 
commerce.12 The digitalization of money in payment cards catered to 
the rise of the consumption economy, as credit is bundled with 
payment, transforming the nature of relatively accessible consumer 
credit.13 The rise of e-commerce further fueled demand for digital 
forms of payment and the rise of fintechs, the earliest of which may be 
Paypal,14 to serve a globally-linked retail economy. Fintechs, 
however, have evolved to challenge the inefficiencies of payment and 
remittance monopolies,15 galvanizing greater adoption of cashless 
transfers.16 The continuous movement of innovation in the fintech 
space shows that we are not lacking in digital payment interfaces and 
the digitalization of money. Hence, it is queried as to why we may 
need a public good in the form of the CBDC as we foster an open and 
competitive space in electronic money and payment innovations.17 
Earlier research into CBDC focused on how consumers demand 
money,18 taking into consideration whether CBDC should replace 
 
12. Peter Gomber et al., On the Fintech Revolution: Interpreting the Forces of 
Innovation, Disruption and Transformation in Financial Services, 35 J. MGMT. 
INFO. SYS. 220–265 (2018). 
13.  See generally Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 
J. CONSUMER RES. 327 (1980). 
14. See Paypal, https://www.paypal.com/uk/home; see also Kerry L 
MacIntosh, The New Money, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659 (1999) (for an early piece 
noting the need for digital money beyond credit cards for e-commerce); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons 
from Paypal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016). 
15. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, A New Era in Fintech Payment Innovations? 
A Perspective from the Institutions and Regulation of Payment Systems, 9 L. 
INNOVATION & TECH. 190 (2017). 
16. See, e.g., The Business Research Company, 
https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/fintech-market. 
17. See The role of the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, 
amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Payment Services 
Directive 2015). 
18. Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution – A Survey 
on Central Bank Digital Currency (BIS Paper No. 101, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331590; Tanai Khiaonarong & David Humphrey, Cash 
Use Across Countries and  the Demand for Central Bank Digital Currency (IMF 
6
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physical cash. CBDC can be regarded as a cost-effective means to 
replace cash, which can be perceived as inefficient because of the 
need for its physical production and replacement, as well as risks in 
terms of its physical handling, relating to loss, theft, and 
counterfeiting.19 Decreased demand for cash and consumer preference 
for electronic payments also seem to underlie the Swedish central 
bank’s experiment with CBDC.20 However, commentators raise the 
fear of financial exclusion for those used to cash and not familiar with 
digital interfaces.21 In this manner, the financial inclusion rationale22 
for CBDC may be weakened. Indeed, central bankers,23 in proceeding 
to an operational phase for CBDCs, have decided not to treat the 
CBDC as a substitute for cash, but to maintain the co-existence of 
CBDC and cash as a matter of principle in order to promote choice.24 
Thus, it can be argued that the public good perception of CBDC 
would not be the total digitalization of money, but rather, an attempt 
to possibly correct the market failures or to improve on market 
inefficiencies in relation to private sector-issued digital money and 
payment systems. 
But what are the market failures or inefficiencies in relation to 
private sector-issued digital money? It can be argued that one area of 
market failure lies in the breakdown of trust between financial 
participants and institutions in relation to cross-border payments and 
remittances within the frameworks of anti-fraud and anti-money 
 
Working Paper, 2019),  https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/03/01/ 
Cash-Use-Across-Countries-and-the-Demand-for-Central-Bank-Digital-Currency-
46617 (demonstrating an opposing view, i.e., the need for physical cash amongst 
populations). 
19. Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal & Vadhindran Rao, Stable 
Cryptocurrencies: First Order Principles, STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 
(2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402701. 
20. Dylan Love, Sweden Is Testing Its New Central Bank Digital Currency, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sweden-is-testing-
its-new-central-bank-digital-currency. 
21. Khiaonarong & Humphrey, supra note 18. 
22. David Andolfatto, Assessing the Impact of Central Bank Digital Currency 
on Private Banks (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2018-026B, 
2018),  https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2018.026. 
23. See BIS, supra note 9. 
24. Id. 
7
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laundering compliance.25 For example, users of consumer credit cards 
have faced blocked payments or card freezes when attempting to make 
payment in a foreign jurisdiction or purchasing from an online retailer 
based overseas.26 The needs of regulatory compliance for financial 
institutions, with rules against money laundering that entail strict 
liability,27 promote skepticism due to each financial institution’s own 
legal risk. This can result in the break-down of coordination amongst 
financial institutions, adversely affecting the smoothness of money 
flows. On the one hand, such hiccups in money flows serve to protect 
financial institutions from legal risk, but on the other, private sector 
financial institutions could improve on coordination in order to 
efficiently detect real instances of financial crime or fraud instead of 
false positives. The regulatory demands of anti-money laundering 
have resulted in a fragmented landscape of trust between international 
financial institutions such as banks and remittance providers. Banks in 
many jurisdictions are risk averse that regulatory compliance by 
correspondent financial institutions may be inadequate, therefore 
enhancing their regulatory risks. This has resulted in the decline of 
correspondent banking for higher-risk jurisdictions and potential 
financial exclusion in an indiscriminate manner.28 
Even where policy initiatives have brought about architectural and 
standardization advantages, such as in the Single European Payments 
 
25. See generally Emily Lee, Financial Inclusion: A Challenge to the New 
Paradigm of Financial Technology, Regulatory Technology and Anti-Money 
Laundering Law,  6 J. BUS. LAW 473 (discussing some effects of de-risking by 
financial institutions due to anti-money laundering compliance). Effects of de-
risking, such as exclusions and access problems, inevitably create barriers to 
efficiency in financial transactions, creating a balance that needs to be struck. Id. 
26. Stephen Little, One in four holidaymakers have had their credit card 
blocked whilst abroad, MONEY PAGES (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.themoneypages.com/latest-news/one-in-four-holidaymakers-has-had-
their-credit-card-blocked-whilst-abroad/. 
27. See, e.g., U.K. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, § 328 (example of a law that 
can be used to incriminate banks that engage in “arrangements” that facilitate money 
laundering. Although the mental elements of “know or suspect” is mentioned in the 
section, the threshold for suspicion is relatively low); see also Lonsdale v National 
Westminster Bank Plc [2018] EWHC 1843 (QB). 
28. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, FSB ACTION PLAN TO ASSESS AND 
ADDRESS THE DECLINE IN CORRESPONDENT BANKING (May 2019), 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P290519-1.pdf. 
8
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Area,29 it is arguable that the efficiency of cross-border payments 
within the Single Market—especially the euro area—can be 
improved.30 Expected smoothness in the outworking of payment 
services can particularly be put to the test where a payment services 
institution fails. For example, the failure of German payment services 
provider Wirecard resulted in uncoordinated approaches by different 
regulators, leaving consumers in markedly inconvenient positions.31 
The harmonization of laws and architecture may still run up against 
the fragmentation of national supervision and coordination if a 
regulated entity becomes mired in crisis. 
The invention of bitcoin—the first private cryptocurrency that can 
be transferred in a cryptographically secure manner across a peer-to-
peer network—in 200932 arguably opened up a space for the migration 
of financial transfers that could have been impeded in mainstream 
financial architecture. Doubtless the transfers of illicit money in 
bitcoin have been discussed at length,33 and criminals are even 
demanding ransom in bitcoin in order to retrieve their ill-gotten gains 
pseudonymously,34 yet, the availability of cryptocurrency blockchains 
 
29. Single Euro Payments Area (“SEPA”) Regulation (EU) No 260/2012. See 
generally JAKUB GÓRKA, TRANSFORMING PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE (2016). 
30. See European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB),The European 
Banking Federation (EBF) & European Savings and Retail Banking Group (ESBG), 
Payments Policy for Europe: Direction for the Next Five Years (2020), 
https://www.finextra.com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/ecsas-policy-paper-
payments.pdf. 
31. Nicholas Megaw, UK consumers dragged into Wirecard’s collapse, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/dbe16ce4-f154-
4985-a210-279fa1f53e24 (reporting on the freezing of customers’ accounts, which 
the FCA subsequently intervened into following customer complaints, and other 
fragmented scrambles in other countries following the German fintech company’s 
collapse); see also Stefania Palma,  Ex-Wirecard clients scramble to process 
payments in Singapore, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3ed31549-a012-4bd4-a130-696790027b7e. 
32. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System 
(2008), available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
33. Damodaran Appukuttan Nair, The Bitcoin Innovation, Crypto Currencies 
and the Leviathan, 9 INNOVATION & DEVELOPMENT 85–103 (2019); Braeden K 
Anderson, Regulating the Future of Finance and Money: A Rational U.S. 
Regulatory Approach to Maximizing the Value of Crypto-Assets and Blockchain 
Systems, 11 BOCCONI LEGAL PAPERS 1 (2018). 
34. AA v Persons Unknown and Bitfinex [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm). 
9
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have also provided an enabling mechanism for those excluded from 
mainstream financial structures,35 many through reasons beyond their 
control.36 Further, private cryptocurrency offers choice where 
governments are perceived to misuse monetary policy.37 Even in 
developed economies where interest rates have remained low for too 
long,38 ordinary citizens can engage in the opportunities for saving in 
cryptocurrency, such as privately issued crypto stablecoins.39 
Interest in the development of the CBDC can thus be attributed to 
the following context: the confluence of coordinative inefficiencies 
and market failures in payment and remittance operationalized by the 
conventional financial sector, and the rise of the programmable 
cryptocurrency that can be transferred from peer-to-peer wallets on 
permissionless blockchains that are not publicly policed.40 
In connection with the public good analysis of the CBDC as 
overcoming market failures and inefficiencies in privately-supplied 
 
35. Armine Soufaih, Revolutionizing International Remittance Payments 
Using Cryptocurrency and Blockchain-based Technology, SOCIAL IMPACT 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE (SIRE) 75 (2020), https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/75; 
Rajendra Kulkarni et al., Cryptocurrency, Stablecoins and Blockchain: Exploring 
Digital Money Solutions for Remittances and Inclusive Economies (66th Annual 
North American Meetings of the Regional Science Association International (13–16 
Nov, 2019), Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511139. 
36. Jay Hao, Financial Inclusion, Cryptocurrency and the Developing World, 
COINTELEGRAPH (June 25, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/financial-
inclusion-cryptocurrency-and-the-developing-world. 
37. Max Raskin, Fahad Saleh & David Yermack, How Do Private Digital 
Currencies Affect Government Policy? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper 
No. 26219, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w26219. 
38. Nares Laopannarai, Can the Fed’s Prolonged Low-Interest Rates Lead 
Bitcoin to the Upside?, SUPERCRYPTONEWS (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.supercryptonews.com/fed-prolonged-low-interest-rates-lead-bitcoin-to-
the-upside/. 
39. See infra Part II. 
40. The Bank of England in particular has a pressing need to reform 
conventional payment systems, especially international remittance in order to 
address the fragmentation and break-downs between financial institutions leading to 
market failures. The development of the CBDC is seen as one avenue of exploration 
for reform. See Victoria Cleland, Cross-border payments – innovating in a changing 
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payment services, CBDC could be supplied for payment in e-
commerce and remittance, in an account-based design, i.e., where 
accounts are maintained directly at the central bank by retail users. 
The central bank takes on the role of payment intermediation in order 
to address the deficiencies of private sector services. In the euro area, 
this can be transformative for remittances. Users could make and 
receive transfers out of and into their CBDC accounts,41 vis-á-vis 
other CBDC accounts held at the central bank, throughout the regional 
market of the euro-area, and across the borders of Member States. 
This is arguably revolutionary in supporting the freedom of movement 
in the Single Market in terms of human capital movement, e-
commerce, peer-to-peer consumption, and even financial services, 
such as peer-to-peer crowdlending. 
The European Central Bank’s (“ECB”) recent proposal to explore 
the operationalization of CBDC is based on the perceived benefits 
above.42 In providing competition with mainstream payment services 
providers in this manner, the ECB envisages that there could be 
migration from mainstream payment services institutions. However, 
financial intermediaries who have hitherto been able to impose rents 
on the users of payment systems43 especially on a cross-border basis 
would have to become competitive and seek improvement and 
innovation on their services. Central banks on the other hand may 
have to be prepared for increased management of user relations, 
especially with consumers. 
Further, a central bank that adopts an account-based design 
benefits from being able to observe payment information and this 
assists in anti-money laundering surveillance, although at the price of 
privacy.44 This likely presents a dilemma for users as at scale, the 
central bank can be in possession of significant amounts of data 
 
41. Harry Leinonen, Electronic Central Bank Cash: To Be or Not to Be?, 13 J. 
PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYSTEMS 20 (2019). 
42. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, REPORT ON A DIGITAL EURO (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/html/digitaleuro.en.html. 
43. Tommaso Mancini- Griffoli et al., Casting Light on Central Bank Digital 
Currency, in CHRIS BRUMMER, CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND 
MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (2019). 
44. Id. Hossein Nabilou, Testing the Waters of the Rubicon: The European 
Central Bank and Central Bank Digital Currencies, J. BANKING REGULATION 
(2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-019-00112-1. 
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regarding private money flows, and data security and handling can 
become of paramount importance and requiring accountability.45 For 
example, the CBDC project rolled out by the Chinese government 
may be viewed with some concern due to the propensity for data 
collection and the exercise of forms of state control. The issuance of 
CBDC is in a pilot phase, limited to four Chinese provinces, and 
incumbent financial institutions such as large state-owned banks and 
major fintech institutions such as Tencent would be wallet providers 
for CBDC.46 The issuance of CBDC may be a way of regularizing the 
uneven landscape in China with its large banking sector being 
digitally backward and the fintech sector becoming disproportionately 
important in credit creation, money supply, and investment services. 
However, an authoritative Chinese commentator47 takes the view that 
CBDC would promote greater security of data and certainty of 
payments in retail use, indicating that the interest in CBDC could lie 
in achieving greater public sector control over flows of money that are 
being dominated by the unevenly regulated fintech sector in China. 
Account-based designs could attract depositors, who would see 
central banks as fail-safe, and bank runs could be virtually 
abolished.48 Commentators worry about whether this would adversely 
affect the credit creation role of banks or indeed this role may be 
pushed onto central banks.49  However, others argue that CBDC 
issuance does not have to entail credit operations and financial 
customers would still need to turn to commercial banks.50 
Nevertheless, the possibility is raised that central banks may need to 
 
45. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42. 
46. Staff, China’s central bank digital currency wallet is revealed, LEDGER 
INSIGHTS (Apr. 16, 2020),  https://www.ledgerinsights.com/china-digital-currency-
wallet-dcep-cbdc/. 
47. Qian Yao, Central Bank Digital Currency: Optimization of the Currency 
System and Its Issuance Design, 12 CHINA ECON. J. 1 (2019). 
48. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Dirk Niepelt, On the Equivalence of Private 
and Public Money, 106 J. MONETARY ECON. 27 (2019); Alex Cukierman, Welfare 
and Political Economy Aspects of a Central Bank Digital Currency (Centre for 
Econ. Pol’y Res. Discussion Paper No. 13728, 2019), 
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13728. 
49. Young Sik Kim & Ohik Kwon, Central Bank Digital Currency and 
Financial Stability (Bank of Korea Working Paper, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3330914. 
50. Brunnermeier & Niepelt, supra note 48. 
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invest “back” into commercial banks to support their roles in the 
private creation of money so that credit is available for economic 
development.51 CBDC issuance can also provide competition in 
relation to the deposit-taking services provided by commercial banks 
and they may raise account interest rates to attract deposits.52 In the 
alternative, to avoid disproportionate inflows into CBDC from the 
private sector, the remuneration of CBDC could be set at a decreasing 
level for high balances, including a negative tier beyond a certain 
threshold.53 
It is arguable that the availability of a CBDC facilitates certain 
novel fiscal and monetary policies. Account-based CBDC designs 
provide novel benefits such as direct monetary policy, where central 
banks could make helicopter money drops or experiment further with 
negative interest rates in order to affect consumption behavior.54 
Fiscal policy can be integrated into account-based CBDC as CBDC 
can be issued based on government debt.55 In light of the needs for 
economies battered by lock-down policies in the wake of the Covid-19 
pandemic, CBDC has been discussed as part of possible fiscal 
stimulation policies.56 It may be argued that fiscal policies are outside 
of the remit of central banks. However, a recent development in the 
United States in expanding the Federal Reserve’s role in combatting 
the adverse economic effects during the Covid-19 pandemic shows 
that central banks are regarded as important partner agencies in fiscal 
 
51. Kim & Kwon, supra note 49. 
52. Andolfatto, supra note 22; Jonathan Chiu et al., Central Bank Digital 
Currency and Banking (Bank of Canada Working Paper, 2019), 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed019/862.html. 
53. Ulrich Bindseil, Tiered CBDC and the Financial System (European 
Central Bank Working Paper No. 2351, 2020), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2351~c8c18bbd60.en.pdf. 
54. Id. See also Nabilou, supra note 44. 
55. Michael Kumhof & Clare Noone, Central Bank Digital Currencies – 
Design Principles and Balance Sheet Implications (Bank of England Working 
Paper, 2018), www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/Working-papers suggest 
that CBDC should not be convertible into bank deposits. 
56. Nikhilesh De, US Lawmakers Talk Digital Dollar, FedAccounts in 
Thursday Hearing, COINDESK (June 10, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/watch-us-
lawmakers-will-talk-digital-dollar-fedaccounts-in-thursday-hearing. 
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policies. The CARES Act 202057 provided for the Federal Reserve’s 
powers to support not only liquidity in debt markets, but also lending 
to small and medium sized businesses. The Federal Reserve in the 
United States introduced the Main Street Lending Program (“MSLP”) 
that provides support to small and mid-size non-financial firms hit by 
the pandemic.58 The MSLP allows the Federal Reserve to set up 
special purpose vehicles to purchase participations in bank business 
loans, therefore supporting private financial sector lending to non-
financial businesses, as long as they have been financially healthy 
prior to the pandemic. In effect, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury are legislatively empowered to act as guarantors while 
private sector banks underwrite and allocate credit.59 
The concerns about the dominance and expanding remits of 
central banks in an account-based design may direct us to consider a 
bearer or token-based design of issuance.60 In a bearer or token-based 
 
57. U.S. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 
H.R. 748, 116th Cong., § 3548 (2020). 
58. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, MAIN 
STREET LENDING PROGRAM (Sept. 8, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm. The 
Program provides the following facilities: the Main Street New Loan Facility 
(MSNLF), the Main Street Priority Loan Facility (MSPLF), the Main Street 
Expanded Loan Facility (MSELF), the Nonprofit Organization New Loan Facility 
(NONLF), and the Nonprofit Organization Expanded Loan Facility (NOELF). 
Loans will be offered by banks, who retain 5 percent of the loan and sell the 
remaining 95 percent to one of three Main Street facilities (the New Loan Facility, 
the Priority Loan Facility, and the Expanded Loan Facility). These facilities vary by 
the type of loan such as loan size, borrower leverage, and whether the loan is new or 
expands an existing loan. All Main Street loans have a five-year maturity, deferring 
interest payments for one year and principal payments for two years, can be prepaid 
without penalty, and have a loan rate of LIBOR plus 3 percentage points. See 
William B. English & J. Nellie Liang, Designing the Main Street Lending Program:  
Challenges and Options (Hutchins Center for Fiscal and Monetary Policy Working 
Paper No. 64, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/designing-themain-street-
lending-program-challenges-andoptions. 
59. Steve Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, The Fed Goes to War: Part 3, 
MONEY & BANKING (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2020/4/12/the-fed-goes-to-war-
part-3 (arguing that the Fed should limit its involvement in the allocation of credit to 
the private nonfinancial sector). 
60. Barontini & Holden, supra note 18 (discussing the types of CDBC, such as 
token-based and account-based). 
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design, central banks would co-opt private sector institutions to 
provide custodial or transfer services for users. Users may interact 
with a commercially-provided user interface as a first port of call, 
although central banks may be involved in maintaining the overall 
architecture, such as expanding the range of accounts that may be 
maintained by intermediaries at the central bank.61 The benefit of this 
would be a call to industry to innovate and provide the relevant 
custodial and transfer services, and this could enroll competition into a 
landscape of payment services, especially from the growing fintech 
sector. Further, the issuance of a CBDC provides the central bank with 
a new opportunity to engage with private sector providers to possibly 
redesign operational and architectural aspects, and this could help 
address in an ex ante manner potential inefficiencies that may arise 
and ensure better coordination amongst different intermediaries. If a 
token-based design for CBDC rollout facilitates new coordination 
between central banks, payment services providers, innovators, 
stakeholders, and the commercial sector, the opportunities for new 
forms of co-governance62 can arise, i.e., the public and private sector 
participants are all incentivized and share in a common sense of 
responsibility to maintain and govern the payment networks and 
infrastructure. Such coordination can bring about more integrated and 
effective designs for users than if designs were generated either from 
the top-down or bottom-up.63 
Although there can be remittance and e-commerce benefits from 
the issuance of a CBDC, whether account-based or token-based, it is 
questionable whether the benefits of investing in and overhauling 
operational and architectural aspects for either design (for central 
banks, existing and would-be payment services intermediaries, 
merchants, and possibly even retail users) would exceed the benefits 
of pursuing greater efficiencies and coordination in existing systems.64 
 
61. Alexander Kriwoluzky & Chi Hyun Kim, Public or Private? The Future of 
Money (Pol’y Dept. for Economic, Scientific & Quality of Life Policies, Directorate-
General for Internal Policies for Econ. Committee, European Parliament, 2019), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/207653/13.%20PE%20642.356%20DIW%
20final%20publication-original.pdf. 
62. FINCK, supra note 2, at 171–180. 
63. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, The 
Digitalization of Money (2019),  http://www.nber.org/papers/w26300. 
64. See Kriwoluzky & Kim, supra note 61. 
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Interested central banks agree that the operationalizing of CBDC in 
the mainstream economy involves significant architectural 
transformations even with existing private sector support. First, the 
“back end” of CBDC in terms of issuance, plugging into commercial 
payment systems, as well as clearing and settlement, requires thinking 
in terms of new infrastructure that may be needed, especially if such 
infrastructure is to become decentralized to leverage upon blockchain 
technology.65 Next, the “front end” also requires thinking in terms of 
user interface, ease and convenience of use, robust custodianship of 
users’ CBDC and resilience from data loss and cyberhacking, and the 
role of the central bank in such user relations.66 Finally, the impact on 
existing providers of electronic money, deposit accounts, and even 
credit needs to be considered.67 
One question still needs to be answered by central bankers keen 
on introducing CBDC into mainstream e-commerce and the retail 
economy: Is there demand among existing consumer users for such a 
currency format? Demand for CBDC such as in the euro area could 
come from direct remittance needs, especially where individuals work 
in a Member State not of their origin, as permitted under the European 
freedom of movement rules, and remit money regularly back to 
another Member State in the euro area. Disruptions for such 
remittances may cause inconvenience and hardship, and individuals 
could be incentivized to move away from their private sector current 
account provider to a CBDC account for such transfers.68 However, it 
may be less likely that demand would come from the quarters of e-
commerce in the European Single Market. The availability of the 
CBDC may impose cost on merchants while not necessarily meeting 
demand on users’ end. This is because CBDC is unable to meet users’ 
demand for credit-backed digital payment, and users may be better off 
relying on private credit providers, such as credit cards which have 
been vastly adapted for e-commerce. In light of extensive cost in 
operational and architectural overhauling, demand patterns in the 
 
65. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42; BIS, supra note 9. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. In this respect the BIS (2020)’s foundational principle for introducing 
CBDC is to do no harm while promoting co-existence with cash and innovation. 
This may extend to preserving financial stability in connection with private sector 
institutions and infrastructure, while not reducing the scope for innovation. 
68. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42. 
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retail universe should be studied carefully in considering what policy 
is best to combat inefficiencies and failures in payment systems.69 
II. THE PARTICULAR RELEVANCE OF CBDC TO THE DAPP ECONOMY 
The mainstream introduction of the CBDC continues to entail 
many questions.70 In light of the challenges surrounding a general 
rollout in the mainstream as canvassed above, this Article proposes 
that an optimal approach could be a limited rollout of CBDC, targeted 
at the dApp economy.71 It may appear to be odd, in the face of 
mainstream discussions regarding how CBDC could transform the 
retail payment landscape, to turn our focus to the dApp economy.  
However, this neglected space in conventional CBDC discussions is 
arguably an optimal space for limited operationalization, as a rollout 
may be more technologically compatible with the architecture of the 
dApp economy and involves less of the operational challenges and 
dilemmas faced by central banks in a general rollout scheme. 
Further, the dApp economy is an economic space still struggling 
to address its monetary order and is likely to benefit from an enabling 
institution such as the CBDC. The institution of the CBDC can 
provide a starting point for mainstream engagement with the dApp 
economy, and pave the way for building out the crypto-economy as a 
governed economic order. This vision is based on theoretical framing 
in the concept of regulatory capitalism.72 The mobilization of the 
dApp economy can also be regarded as furthering the European Single 
Digital Market Strategy73 and can be supported by both policy and 
law. The development of the dApp economy is of importance to the 
 
69. Sheila Dow, Monetary Reform, Central Banks, and Digital Currencies, 48 
INT’L J. POL. ECON. 153 (2019). 
70. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 42; BIS, supra note 9. 
71. See generally ANDREW ROMANS, MASTERS OF BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL 
COIN OFFERINGS (2018). 
72. See infra Part III, Section C. 
73. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on the Implementation of 
the Digital Single Market Strategy: A Connected Digital Single Market for All 
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European Union as many start-ups and innovative business ideas are 
arising in this space.74 The need to incorporate disruptive technologies 
in the Digital Single Market initiative75 has now been more explicitly 
articulated in the new action plan for the capital markets union.76 The 
CBDC can be seen as part a facilitative mosaic for policy 
developments. 
This Article proposes a limited rollout of the CBDC in the dApp 
economy to facilitate investment in dApp developments in particular. 
Such a limited rollout would occur in an economic space that is 
relatively “bounded,” as activities within this realm are currently not 
too porous to mainstream commerce. The limited rollout initiative can 
be contained and experimental, not significantly affecting or 
disrupting the rest of the economy. Further, the limited rollout is 
particularly beneficial for the crypto-economy and particularly 
efficient for central banks. The dApp economy is still endeavoring to 
develop private cryptocurrencies of sufficient monetary qualities, as 
will be discussed below. The CBDC enjoys established monetary 
qualities. Central banks would also benefit from discourse with private 
sector developers in relation to the CBDC’s programmability and 
robustness, lessons that can be relevant to further-reaching rollouts in 
the future. A limited rollout of the CBDC can take place in the dApp 
economy in order to observe uptake, demand, and operational issues. 
A. The Evolution of the dApp Economy 
The bitcoin blockchain was introduced in 2008 by a 
pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto77 in order to allow private payments 
to be made securely and efficiently between individuals without 
needing to involve existing intermediaries in the banking and financial 
 
74. See, e.g., chainEurope, https://www.chaineurope.org/blockchain-startups/ 
(providing a directory of all European blockchain start-ups). 
75. See McKinsey & Co., Shaping the Digital Transformation in Europe 
(European Commission Working Paper: Economic Potential, 2020). 
76. European Commission, Capital Markets Union 2020 Action Plan: A 
Capital Markets Union for People and Businesses (2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/capital-
markets-union/capital-markets-union-2020-action-plan_en [hereinafter Capital 
Markets Union Action Plan]. 
77. Nakamoto, supra note 32. 
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system. The global banking crisis in 2007 to 200978 loomed large in 
this context. Indeed, this development could be seen not only as a 
technological innovation, but as a statement of distrust of the 
prevailing financial institutions at that time.79 
Purporting to be a private currency, bitcoin is most famously 
depicted in an exchange context, like in the following illustration. 
Imagine that Alice can send Bob bitcoins in order to discharge a 
payment obligation or to transfer value to Bob. How this is achieved is 
that Alice initiates a transfer of bitcoin which she owns, manifested by 
a string of digital data unique to the coins (which is known as the 
public key to the coins), by using a private key to which she is 
authorized (and which is mathematically related to the public key). As 
the transaction is private in nature, the integrity of the system can only 
be maintained if the double spend problem is prevented, i.e., that the 
system prevents Alice from being able to send the same coins to 
someone else again. The transaction is validated only by the 
community within the system—known individually as nodes—whose 
computers are connected to and have joined the bitcoin network. 
From the early days of bitcoin, anyone can be a node, and 
membership of the bitcoin blockchain is purportedly highly 
democratized. Nodes are responsible for and compete to validate 
transactions on the bitcoin blockchain, as validation is incentivized by 
the reward of new bitcoins.  Validation is carried out on the 
blockchain, which is a network cumulative database that records all of 
the transactions in bitcoin, of which each node would have an 
identical copy. The distributed ledger is thus tamper-proof and fail-
safe at the same time as it is highly challenging for nodes to alter the 
ledger unilaterally across all identical copies and there is no single 
point of failure for the ledger. 
Furthering our previous illustration, when Alice and Bob 
complete their transfer and this transaction is “proposed” to nodes, the 
 
78. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A 
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/18_03_09_turner_review.pdf. 
79. Dan Bousfield, Crypto-coin Hierarchies: Social Contestation in 
Blockchain Networks, 19 GLOBAL NETWORKS 291 (2019); Moritz Hutten & 
Matthias Thiemann, Moneys at the Margins: From Political Experiment to Cashless 
Societies, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018). 
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transaction is broadcast with the public key of the bitcoin sent and a 
digital signature. Nodes do not know Alice’s private key, but need to 
verify if the digital signature is mathematically coherent with the 
public key of the bitcoins sent. Nodes may verify in a decentralized 
manner, and generally, several confirmations for one transaction 
would increase the chances of its validity. The validation of 
transactions is carried out by mining for “blocks,” which are clusters 
of transactional data grouped together in order to constitute a valid 
and immutable section of ledger data that would be accepted by all. 
Miners compete to gather confirmed transactions within a time period, 
say 10 minutes, and verify them by running “seed inputs” into the 
hashing algorithm of the bitcoin blockchain until mathematical 
coherence is achieved for all the transactions in the block. Miners 
validate the integrity of transactions and assure that there is no double 
spending according to previous validated records in blocks. The new 
block is then hashed together with a “block header” that comprises the 
block’s identification hash and the previous block’s hash, and is 
timestamped in order to be added to the previous block. This mining 
protocol is known as “proof-of-work,” which is derived from 
established cryptographic methodology. Nodes have to confirm the 
block before it is authoritatively added to the ledger, and the 
successful miner receives a reward for mining, which started at 25 
bitcoins per block and gradually decreasing in an algorithmically 
determined manner. Decentralized competition provides the incentive-
based mechanism for maintaining the distributed ledger, but the 
competitive process for mining can result in waste of “work” by other 
miners as well as perverse incentives in the competitive process such 
as attacks on other miners or hijacking of others’ computational 
power.80 
The bitcoin blockchain can be regarded as an efficient payment 
mechanism as miners take on average 10 minutes to verify a 
transaction, compared to days taken for international remittances 
through banks. It may also be regarded as an alternative payment or 
remittance system for unbanked peoples.81 However, the cost-
 
80. Yue Wang et al., Pool Strategies Selection in PoW-Based Blockchain 
Networks: Game-Theoretic Analysis, 7 IEEE ACCESS 8427 (2019). 
81. Ignacio Mas & David Lee Kuo Chuen, Bitcoin-Like Protocols and 
Innovations, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015). 
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effective access to unbanked peoples potentially obscures a problem 
in relation to the distribution of cost in maintaining the network. 
Where payment systems are managed by centralized intermediaries, 
they bear the cost of maintenance of the network by charging fees to 
users, but users also get the benefit of institutional protections 
regarding mistakes and failures.82 In a distributed payment network, 
the cost of maintaining the network is theoretically distributed across 
all nodes. However, users are spared from bearing the cost as miners 
are incentivized to undertake maintenance. Nevertheless, in order to 
ensure that the blockchain is maintained at an optimal level, the cost 
of validation cannot be too low, and this is evidenced by significant 
amounts of energy spent83 by miners’ computers solving the 
mathematic hash puzzles in order to identify valid transactions. The 
carbon footprint of such maintenance is arguably sub-optimal, and it 
also results in the undermining of democratization in the blockchain as 
mining pools or clusters become oligopolistic and powerful.84 
Bitcoin is still not widely adopted as an alternative payment 
system to the real economy. Retailers who voluntarily accept 
cryptocurrency as payment remain a minority, and may be 
concentrated in markets where consumers are young and technology-
savvy.85 However, the invention of the bitcoin blockchain paved the 
 
82. See generally Chiu, supra note 15. 
83. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal 
Introduction to Distributed and Centralized Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2018) (documenting that about 200kw of energy is consumed to validate each 
transaction). 
84. Francesca Musiani, Alexandre Mallard & Cécile Méadel, Governing What 
Wasn’t Meant to Be Governed: A Controversy-Based Approach to the Study of 
Bitcoin Governance, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018); see also 
Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn & Marcel Goguen, Blockchains, Trust And Action 
Nets: Extending the Pathologies of Financial Globalization, 19 GLOBAL NETWORKS 
308 (2019). 
85. Nicole Jonker, What Drives the Adoption of Crypto-Payments by Online 
Retailers?, 35 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH &APPLICATIONS 100848 (2019). 
It remains to be seen if the adoption of mainstream payment services, such as Paypal 
that offers cryptocurrency custody and credit cards that may offer bitcoin rewards, 
may galvanize mainstream adoption, see 
https://www.paypal.com/us/smarthelp/article/cryptocurrency-on-paypal-faq-
faq4398; BlockFi’s credit card that promises cryptocurrency rewards. See BlockFi, 
https://blockfi.com/bitcoin-card-crypto-rewards. 
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way for the development of the Ethereum blockchain, which is now an 
alternative economic space powered by its native cryptocurrency, 
ether. Indeed, for holders of bitcoin as the leading cryptocurrency, 
ether has become the most significant private cryptocurrency for the 
alternative space of crypto-commerce. Hence, the bitcoin-ether pair of 
exchange transactions has grown exponentially in value and volume.86 
The Ethereum blockchain went live in July 2015. The 
achievement of the Ethereum blockchain is that it does not function 
principally as a payment ledger, unlike the case of the original bitcoin 
blockchain. Rather, it is an underlying infrastructure that supplies a 
ledger and a protocol token, ether, that codes in basic laws of 
functionalities that can then be used to execute more specific “smart 
contracts” in application tokens. 
The Ethereum blockchain provides an infrastructure that has a 
relatively developed permissionless ledger87 and protocol tokens88 that 
code in basic laws of functionalities. These tokens are used to build 
more specific “smart contract”89 code by dApp developers. The first 
protocol token—the ERC-20—which has since been improved by the 
Ethereum Foundation, is open source code that can be utilized by any 
dApp developer to build specific transactional code that stores, 
accesses and exchanges information, embeds entitlements, executes 
exchanges, and functions as the currency of the transaction.90 DApp 
 
86. See, e.g., Bitcoin (BTC), COINGECKO, 
https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/bitcoin/eth (showing daily transactions 
hovering over $500 million per day). 
87. This means the network is open to participation by anyone. 
88. These provide for the basic needs and functionalities for the blockchain 
infrastructure as a whole, and are differentiated from application tokens more 
specific to particular transactions. See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-
based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public 
Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463 (2019). 
89. These refer to automated protocols for action execution. “Smart contracts” 
are not the same as binding contracts in the legal sense. See generally Eliza Mik, 
Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity, 9 
L. INNOVATION & TECH. 269 (2017). 
90. Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and the Struggle of 
Law and Regulation to Keep Peace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018); Dragan Zelic & 
Nenad Baros, Cryptocurrency: General Challenges of Legal Regulation and the 
Swiss Model of Regulation, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS OF 33RD INTERNATIONAL 
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT – 
“MANAGERIAL ISSUES IN MODERN BUSINESS” 168 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2018); 
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developers would build out and sell application tokens91 to 
participants who wish to join the dApp network and benefit from its 
peer-to-peer marketplace. In such networks/marketplaces, participants 
are free to transact with each other, powered by dApp tokens. 
Transactional validity and record-keeping are based on the consensus 
protocol for maintenance on the Ethereum blockchain, which is 
decentralized. Such consensus protocol has evolved since the days of 
the bitcoin blockchain.92 
The ether is the native token of the Ethereum blockchain, just as 
the bitcoin is the native token of the bitcoin blockchain. However, 
bitcoin’s functionalities are limited, and its script is narrowly 
comprised of transfer and recording functions. Compare this with the 
ERC-20 token, which is coded with more universal functional 
qualities such as transferring within allowance limits, from specified 
locations, approval protocols, and permitting access to data. These 
universal qualities allow coders to build upon the token code with 
more specific functions for particular commercial applications.93 
These applications or dApps can then offer new opportunities for 
economic and commercial activity, such as the sale of CryptoKitties 
over the internet.94 Since 2015, business innovations have exploded in 
 
Sandra Díaz-Santiago, Lil María Rodríguez-Henríquez & Debrup Chakraborty, A 
Cryptographic Study of Tokenization Systems, 15 INT’L J. INFO. SECURITY 413 
(2016) (arguing that multifunctional tokens are efficient). 
91. These are usually sold as pre-development tokens. Such sales have raised 
much controversy in many jurisdictions.  Jurisdictions like the United States choose 
to treat these as securities offers although there are distinctive characteristics 
different with these sales, and other jurisdictions treat these as regulated or 
otherwise on a case-by-case basis. See U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securites-issuuance-and-
trading [hereinafter SEC Guidance 2018]; see also Financial Conduct Authority, 
Guidance on Cryptoassets: Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3 (July 2019), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps19-22.pdf; Alex Collomb, Primavera de 
Fillippi & Klara Sok, Blockchain Technology and Financial Regulation: A Risk-
Based Approach to the Regulation of ICOs, 10 EUR. J. RISK REGULATION 263 
(2019). 
92. Nakamoto, supra note 32. 
93. Rohr &Wright, supra note 88 (describing the difference between protocol 
and application tokens). 
94. CryptoKitties is a game available on the Ethereum blockchain. See 
CryptoKitties, available at https://www.cryptokitties.co/. 
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the dApp economy, built on this framework. The Ethereum 
blockchain now hosts 90 percent of the dApp economy.95 
B. The Structures of the dApp Economy 
In the dApp economy, economic agents can act as prosumers,96 
selling virtual goods and services, as well as consuming these 
according to their needs. Economic relationships are no longer defined 
as business (or commercial, corporatized entities) vis-á-vis consumers. 
These economic relationships take place over blockchain-based 
platforms, built upon algorithmic processes that support precisely 
automated transactions (coded in digital “tokens”), and facilitate 
record-keeping in a decentralized manner.97 Unlike in the sharing 
economy where online platforms are owned by corporations that 
extract rent and capitalize on the network effects and data flowing 
through their platforms,98 blockchain-based platforms are usually 
developed in an open source manner.99 Scholars have recognized the 
economic structuration offered by blockchains and the mode of 
exchange offered by tokenization bring about a new form of 
institutional technology for economic activity.100 
It is remarkable that the Ethereum blockchain has fostered a 
thriving dApp economy despite the potential inconvenience and cost 
of decentralized coordination in transaction validation and ledger 
construction, and the constant need to rely on bottom-up processes to 
 
95. Matthias Fromberger & Lars Haffke, ICO Market Report 2018/2019 – 
Performance Analysis of 2018’s Initial Coin Offerings (2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512125. 
96. For example, economic agents can act on both the supply and demand 
sides of the market. 
97. Discussed shortly in relation to the mining protocols. 
98. THE LAW OF ORGANISATIONS AND GOVERNANCE: RESPONDING TO 
DISRUPTIVE BUSINESS MODELS AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (Iris H-Y Chiu & 
Roger M. Barker eds., 2020). 
99. Primavera de Filippi, Translating Commons-Based Peer Production 
Values into Metrics: Toward Commons-Based Cryptocurrencies, in HANDBOOK OF 
DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG 
DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015). 
100. See generally CHRIS BERG, SINCLAIR DAVIDSON & JASON POTTS, 
UNDERSTANDING THE BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CRYPTOECONOMICS (2019). 
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foster institutional support for the crypto-economy generally. The 
global value of the dApp economy is estimated to be at $14 billion.101 
Further, transaction confirmations on the Ethereum blockchain 
average between 15 seconds and 5 minutes,102 and each block of the 
ledger is mined at an average of under 20 seconds.103 Other 
innovations have arisen to compete with the Ethereum blockchain to 
supply protocol infrastructure to facilitate dApp developments. These 
include blockchains such as Tron,104 with its native currency as Trx; 
and Algorand,105 with its native currency as the Algo. However, 
empirical research finds that much of the traffic on blockchains other 
than Ethereum are back and forth transfers and not genuinely 
productive economic activity.106 
Although many dApps pertain to decentralized finance or 
“DeFi,”107 which attempts to allow peer-to-peer transactions in 
finance to take place to avoid the rent extraction of financial 
intermediaries in the conventional economy,108 a large number of 
dApps are commercial in nature, providing innovative virtual goods 
and services amongst peers. For example, the dApp economy 
facilitates the commoditization of new virtual goods such as the sale 
of CryptoKitties109 or a piece of virtual real estate in gaming worlds 
such as Decentraland.110  It is true that the sale of virtual art or 
 
101. Bullman, Klemm & Pinna, supra note 10. 
102. Eth Gas Station Blog, How long does an Ethereum transaction really 
take (June 5, 2019), https://ethgasstation.info/blog/Ethereum-transaction-how-long/. 
103. Etherscan, Ethereum Average Block Time Chart, 
https://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime (noting data from January 2020). 
104. See, e.g., Tron, available at https://tron.network. 
105. See, e.g., Algorand, available at https://www.algorand.com. 
106. Daniel Perez, Jiahua Xu & Benjamin Livshits, Revisiting Transactional 
Statistics of High-scalability Blockchains 27–29 (ACM Internet Measurement 
Conference, 2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.02693. 
107. Sid Coelho-Prabhu, A Beginner’s Guide to Decentralized Finance 
(DeFi), COINBASE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://blog.coinbase.com/a-beginners-guide-to-
decentralized-finance-defi-574c68ff43c4. 
108. Asia Blockchain Review, Decentralized Finance: Defying the Global 
Financial System, ASIA BLOCKCHAIN REV. (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://www.asiablockchainreview.com/decentralized-finance-defying-the-global-
financial-system/. 
109. CryptoKitties, supra note 94. 
110. See, e.g., Decentraland, available at https://decentraland.org. 
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participation in online gaming are not new phenomena, however, the 
blockchain-based infrastructure promotes economic relationships in a 
peer-to-peer fashion that supports new forms of “prosumerism.” 
Economic relationships can be made more multifaceted and complex 
as users can assume roles on both the supply and demand sides of the 
marketplace. For example, the marketplace for CryptoKitties can 
accommodate many individual artists, but users can add further value 
by breeding their kitties on the peer-to-peer gaming platform and 
selling them. 
Prosumerism is even more pronounced in a few other novel 
business models. First, we turn to Iungo’s blockchain-based global 
wireless facility. We often need to remain connected to the internet 
while traveling, however, access to Wi-Fi may be patchy and mobile 
data can be expensive, especially overseas. Iungo’s111 business plan 
utilizes a blockchain system to link up private users’ Wi-Fi networks, 
so that at scale, a comprehensive network of Wi-Fi access can be 
constructed across the globe, contributed by private users or peers. 
Participants on Iungo’s platform can rent out their Wi-Fi access 
facilities to ad hoc users on-the-go.  Participation in this system is 
tokenized by the ING token, which allows access to the global Wi-Fi 
network and enables transfer of value. This system is built using the 
Ethereum smart contract template and is not directly built upon the 
Ethereum blockchain. This enables an “inner economy” powered by 
token-holders’ supply and demand, which would not be affected 
distortions caused by holders of ether.112 Iungo’s peer-to-peer global 
wireless internet access platform is novel and useful, and overcomes 
the jurisdictional oligopolies for mobile internet access that has 
sustained a market for expensive mobile data roaming charges. At 
scale, such a model can potentially become a peer-to-peer constructed 
global utility. 
Second, Golem113 is a peer-to-peer service marketplace that 
brings together participants who have idle computing power and users 
who wish to borrow others’ computing power to engage in computing 
tasks that require significant capacity. Users who need access to 
 
111. See, e.g., Iungo, available at https://iungo.network. 
112. See, e.g., ING Tokens, IUNGO, https://iungo.network/ing-tokens/ 
(discussing ING tokens). 
113. See, e.g., Golem, available at https://golem.network. 
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significant computing power may include graphic artists or small 
animation studios that require significant computing power to render 
sophisticated graphics. Such tasks can usually be performed using 
expensive graphics processors, or by borrowing a host of computers 
joined together to supply the capacity needed on the user’s computer. 
Golem provides such a peer-to-peer worldwide network for the supply 
and demand side. Moreover, participation in this economy is again 
tokenized, so that the GNT token provides access, and matching of 
tasks with suitable nodes’ computing systems. Tasks are also subject 
to automated “sharding,” i.e., to divide the task among a number of 
nodes in order to maximize the capacity needed for the task and 
ensure no single point of failure. In this manner, the task is efficiently 
and effectively achieved and value creation is distributed among a 
number of nodes, creating an egalitarian system. 
It may be argued that Golem’s business model is not new, as there 
are commercial server farms that rent out computational capacity to 
others. Golem’s novelty lies in its scaling up to a global marketplace 
by the standardization and commoditization of its arrangements via 
tokenization, without necessarily an underlying relational fabric. 
Next, we also observe that peer-to-peer cloud storage services 
may take off at the scale of a global marketplace. Key players in this 
field include Storj,114 Maidsafe,115 and Filecoin.116 Peer-to-peer cloud 
storage services allow individual users, i.e., peers to provide and rent 
out spare hard disk capacity in order to store other users’ files. This 
meets the need of cloud storage for users who are looking for off-site 
storage of their files, currently provided by technological giants such 
as Apple, Google, or Amazon. Peer-to-peer cloud storage services 
would not be using the robust servers that technological corporate 
giants have, but would be relying on the construction of a vast joint-up 
space provided by individual contributors who join the network. Such 
a business model potentially disrupts oligopolies in this space, 
providing choice and price competition, and arguably a more secure 
and private means of storage. Peer-to-peer cloud storage systems 
enable protocols that “shard” files in order to distribute and replicate 
copies of data across nodes. In this manner, nodes do not have access 
 
114. See, e.g., Storj, available at https://storj.io. 
115. See, e.g., Maidsafe, available at https://maidsafe.net. 
116. See, e.g., Filecoin, available at https://filecoin.io. 
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to entire pieces of information that may compromise privacy and the 
downtime or failure of any one node is unlikely to compromise the 
sending and retrieval of files.117 Further, peers on the supply side are 
paid for their services, which opens up a “sharing economy” for 
economic mobilization of individuals. However, encryption is usually 
the responsibility of users before they send files off to storage on the 
relevant networks. 
The above examples show novel ideas that can potentially scale 
up to global marketplaces for services that may have been thought to 
be most efficiently provided by corporatized institutions with 
powerful servers. The dApp economy provides opportunities for new 
economic mobilization118 as individual users can now commoditize 
their Wi-Fi facilities, idle computing power, or storage space. New 
value chains can be created and captured by new economic actors.119 
Such global marketplaces are a further development from the “sharing 
economy” phenomenon that has brought about new commoditization 
and economic mobilization since the 1990s.120 
C. The Problems with the Monetary Order of the dApp Economy 
The dApp economy is facilitated by private cryptocurrencies. The 
first private cryptocurrency—bitcoin—has continued to survive its 
notoriety,121 volatility,122 and express pronouncements by many that it 
 
117. Seline Jung, Filecoin v. Sia, Storj & MaidSafe: The Crowded Push for 
Decentralized Storage, TOKEN REPORT (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://medium.com/tokenreport/filecoin-v-sia-storj-maidsafe-the-crowded-push-for-
decentralized-storage-7157eb5060c9. 
118. Daivi Rodima-Taylor & William W. Grimes, Cryptocurrencies and 
Digital Payment Rails in Networked Global Governance: Perspectives on Inclusion 
and Innovation, in BITCOIN AND BEYOND: CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed. 2018) (extending insights 
beyond the cryptocurrency system). 
119. See generally Alain Yee Loong Chong et al., Business on Chain: A 
Comparative Case Study of Five Blockchain-Inspired Business Models, 20 J. ASS’N 
FOR INFO. SYS.1308 (2019). 
120. See generally ARUN SUNDARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016). 
121. Henrik Karlstrøm, Do Libertarians Dream of Electric Coins? The 
Material Embeddedness of Bitcoin, 15 Distinktion: Scandinavian J. SOC. THEORY 
23, 24–36 (2014); Damodaran Appukuttan Nair, The Bitcoin Innovation, Crypto 
Currencies and the Leviathan, 9 INNOVATION & DEV. 85, 86–103 (2019). 
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does not function as good money,123 in relation to its utility being a 
unit of account, a store of value, and a medium of exchange. Although 
bitcoin has become much more of a speculative asset124 due to its 
potential to achieve high prices, the most important private 
cryptocurrency in the dApp economy is ether. Ether has not been 
subject to the same levels of commoditized inflation as bitcoin, but it 
also suffers from sub-optimal monetary qualities that may ultimately 
affect its role as currency in the dApp economy. In this light, CBDC 
may address the weaknesses of the monetary order of the dApp 
economy and provide for the needs of its scaling up, appealing to the 
possibility of mainstream mobilization. 
The dApp economy has grown in spite of its monetary order of 
unregulated crypto-currencies. However, its scalability and wide 
accessibility may be hampered by a continuation of the existing state. 
CBDC, if programmable into the blockchain protocols for the dApp 
economy, can pave the way for the galvanization of commerce and 
investment. DApp businesses can appeal more directly to mainstream 
consumers used to fiat currencies, and possibly draw in greater 
participation. Both businesses and consumers may also prefer the 
greater familiarity and predictability of the digitalized fiat currency in 
relation to it being a store of value, a unit of account, and a medium of 
exchange. Fundraising by dApp developers conducted in CBDC can 
also be more generally appealing to mainstream retail and institutional 
investors. 
Private cryptocurrencies are unlikely to meet the needs of scale, 
certainty, and consumer protection in an expansion of the dApp 
economy. This is because of (1) the lack of governance of the 
commons of cryptocurrencies affects their key role as a medium of 
exchange, and (2) the commoditization of cryptocurrencies adversely 
affects their roles as supplying a unit of account and store of value, 
which in turn adversely affects their role as a medium of exchange. 
 
122. See generally Marc Gronwald, Is Bitcoin a Commodity? On Price Jumps, 
Demand Shocks, and Certainty of Supply, 97 J. INT’L MONEY & FINANCE 86 (2019). 
123. Emilios Avgouleas & William Blair, The Concept of Money in the 4th 
Industrial Revolution – A Legal and Economic Analysis (Feb. 17, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3534701. 
124. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122. 
29
Chiu: Central Bank Digital Currency for the Crypto-economy: An Experi-m
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021
2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021  9:44 AM 
282 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
Hence market-based solutions, such as stablecoins, are being 
developed. However, as we shall discuss, there are functional and 
regulatory risks abound for stablecoins. 
1. Weaknesses of Private Cryptocurrencies as Money 
Private cryptocurrencies’ weaknesses lie in their commoditization 
as well as in how their payment functions are governed. As discussed 
above, cryptocurrency blockchains are supported by protocols for 
transaction validation and ledger construction. Although these 
protocols are regarded as essential “governance” structures, many 
blockchain networks do not offer much more by way of governance 
institutions beyond those. For example if payment is effected in 
private cryptocurrency where transactions have on-chain and off-chain 
legs,125 disputes that arise in the off-chain leg are not accommodated 
within internal governance institutions in the blockchain-based 
network, and users face the problem of the irreversibility of 
payment.126 Private law systems may meet users’ redress needs in a 
blockchain-based cryptocurrency transaction but there would be 
differences among different jurisdictions127  where private law is 
applied. Crucially, there could be disputes as to which body of private 
law may apply based on the location of the transaction, which could 
comprise a number of on-chain and off-chain legs. 
Further the governance of blockchain networks is still being 
developed in terms of clarifying users’ involvement and rights.128 
 
125. Meaning that elements of the transaction cannot simply be performed and 
completed on-chain, such as where verification of information pre-transaction is 
required, or where ex-post delivery of goods or performance of services are required 
physically. 
126. See Jared Arcari, Decoding Smart Contracts: Technology, Legitimacy, & 
Legislative Uniformity, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FINANCIAL L. 363, 365 (2019). 
127. See generally BLOCKCHAINS, SMART CONTRACTS, DECENTRALISED 
AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONS AND THE Law (Daniel Kraus, Thierry Obrist & 
Olivier Hari eds., 2019) (discussing extensively the differences in how private law is 
applied in different jurisdictions for users’ redress needs in a blockchain-based 
cryptocurrency transaction); see also THE LAW OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES (David Fox 
& Sarah Green eds., 2019). 
128. This is an emerging and fragmented landscape, as different dApp 
communities may adopt different governance rules, and even democratic set-ups can 
be susceptible to majoritarian control.  See Phillip Hacker, Corporate Governance 
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Blockchain networks foster clusters of power among code 
developers129 and miners130 that can undermine the democratic ethos 
of permission-less blockchains. If there is abusive or undesirable 
behavior on a blockchain, for example in the face of a collusive “51% 
attack” 131on the blockchain to seize power, the default mode of 
governance is that selective clusters of users may pursue a hard fork, 
so as to deviate from the chain and create a separate chain/community. 
Forking can create uncertainties as to participants’ transactions and 
assets and it is not necessarily the go-to solution for governing anti-
social behavior. Blockchain networks require the development of 
more sophisticated governance mechanisms and protocols, and 
reliance on forking can be regarded as relatively “primitive.” The 
underdevelopment of governance affects rights, obligations, and 
responsibilities surrounding the core payment function on blockchain 
networks. 
Next, the commoditization of cryptocurrencies began with bitcoin. 
It was not invented to serve a parallel crypto-economy, but was meant 
to compete with fiat currency payment systems. Thus, private 
exchanges arose all over the world132 in order to offer exchange 
between bitcoin and fiat currencies. The value for such exchange 
became determined by social and community sentiment133 and 
 
for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision Making in 
Blockchain-Based Organizations, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); Wessel Reijers et al., 
Now the Code Runs Itself: On-Chain and Off-Chain Governance of Blockchain 
Technologies,  TOPOI: 1–11 (2018). 
129. Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Initial Coin Offerings and the Value 
of Crypto Tokens (MIT Sloan Res. Paper No. 5347–18, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3137213. 
130. Bronwyn E. Howell, Petrus H. Potgeiter & Bert M. Sadowski, Open-
Source or Open-Slather? Governing Blockchain Applications as Common-Pool 
Resources (TPRC47: The 47th Conference on Comm., Info., and Internet Pol’y, 
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427166. 
131. The 51% attack is a scenario where at least 51% of nodes on the 
permissionless blockchain collude in order to bring about a seizure of power. See 
Muhammad Saad et al., Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Systematic 
Overview 1 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.03487.pdf. 
132. See, e.g., Coinbase, Bitfinex, and Binance. 
133. See Nic Carter, Cryptoasset Valuation, in CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, 
REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES (Chris Brummer ed. 2019); but see 
Udo Milkau & Jürgen Bott, Digital Currencies and the Concept of Money as a 
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speculation,134 as rudimentary institutions such as capped supply and 
capped mining rewards do not provide a sufficient informational or 
institutional environment to regulate prices efficiently.135 Bitcoin 
became highly commoditized and its price volatile, mimicking, in 
several researchers’ findings, the prices of exhaustible commodities 
such as oil.136 The commoditization of bitcoin has invariably affected 
other cryptocurrencies even if they have been developed for different 
purposes. Even newer cryptocurrencies that are geared towards being 
fundamentally functional, such as ether, have joined the same market 
for interchangeability with bitcoin, altcoins, and fiat currencies. 
The commoditization of the monetary order of the dApp economy 
can adversely affect cryptocurrencies’ roles as units of account and 
store of value, incentivizing even more speculative trading in them 
and exchange activity. Volatile prices of cryptocurrencies means that 
the “real” value of a virtual good or service in the dApp economy is 
fluctuating constantly, rendering the unit of account function 
meaningless. Both producers and consumers would constantly be 
trading in and out of their holdings in order to manage value, resulting 
in more financialized behavior than is necessary for sustaining 
commerce. This environment can deter the scalability of the dApp 
economy as mainstream users may not be willing or able to undertake 
efforts in order to compensate for the poor monetary qualities of 
cryptocurrency, and choose not to participate in the commercial 
aspects of the dApp economy entirely. It may be counter-argued that 
users can also be drawn to the state of the monetary order, as they can 
both experience commercial transactions in crypto goods and services 
while managing the investment aspect of the coins they hold. 
However, going by F. A. Hayek’s assumption that economic agents 
ultimately want price stability,137 and the fact that central banks 
 
Social Agreement, 12 J. PAYMENTS STRATEGY & SYS. 213 (2018) (noting the social 
underpinnings do not confer on such currencies stability, and volatility can still 
result in how the community perceives and uses the currency, e.g., for illicit 
purposes). 
134. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122. 
135. See Nabilou, supra note 44. 
136. See generally Gronwald, supra note 122. 
137. F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION  OF MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES (Inst. of Economic Affairs, 
London, 1976). 
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around the world safeguard this as their main mandate, it is unlikely 
that most users would enjoy the price volatility of their coins meant 
for transactional purposes,138 even if a number of them would also 
desire price volatility for investment arbitrage. 
2. Stablecoins as Market-based Response 
Bottom-up solutions have been developed to satisfy this 
impossible coincidence of wants—both price stability for crypto 
commerce and price volatility for crypto investment. These are in the 
form of stablecoins. Stablecoins are designed to maintain their market 
values within certain parameters, therefore providing for their price 
stability. 
The ECB139 has surveyed two key stablecoin techniques, 
including: (1) maintaining stable values as pegged to or based on 
collateral, such as certain fiat currencies or even a basket of fiat or 
crypto-currencies; and (2) maintaining stability by automated 
protocols that respond to excess demand or supply of coins, therefore 
performing central-bank like monetary functions. Protocols could be 
coded to trigger airdrop when supply needs to be boosted. If 
contraction of supply is desirable, protocols can be coded to 
incentivize users to “lock” or sell coins for a fee in order to build up 
“reserves,” and reserves can be used to purchase coins on the market 
for lock-up or burning in order to reduce the monetary supply.140 
The first technique would give rise to stablecoins as hedging 
instruments for cryptocurrency users. However, stablecoins may not 
be well integrated as programmable currency in the blockchain 
protocol. The second technique requires more complex programming 
for the native currency of the blockchain.141  Empirical research has 
 
138. Avgouleas & Blair, supra note 123. 
139. Bullman, Klemm & Pinna, supra note 10. 
140. This is the model for Basis, a stablecoin, but Basis has since shut down in 
December 2018. See Brady Dale, Basis Stablecoin Confirms Shutdown, Blaming 
‘Regulatory Constraints,’ COINDESK (Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/basis-stablecoin-confirms-shutdown-blaming-regulatory-
constraints. 
141. Ingolf Gunnar Anton Pernice et al., Monetary Stabilisation in 
Cryptocurrencies - Design Approaches and Open Questions (Crypto Valley 
Conference on Blockchain Technology, IEEE, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3398372. 
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found the second technique to be less than successful in achieving 
stability in value.142 For example, Ampleforth143 is an algorithmically-
managed stablecoin whose values are adjusted by demand-side 
information that is constantly updated. However, although it purports 
to be self-adjusting and uncorrelated with bitcoin and ether’s market 
volatility, its own price has fluctuated in a similar pattern to the more 
volatile cryptocurrencies. Further, Yam—a “decentralized finance” 
experiment attempting to offer an algorithmic stability mechanism for 
its coin against the U.S. dollar, was initially greeted in the crypto-
economy with much hope. However, a serious bug was ultimately 
discovered shortly after a successful round of token offering, leading 
to the entire project being written off.144 
Stablecoins based on collateralization are much more popular, but 
their relationships with fiat currencies and other financial assets means 
that they would not be left in a regulatory lacuna.145  Such regulatory 
developments have arguably been triggered by the proposed 
introduction of Libra—which has now been rebranded as Diem—by a 
consortium led by Facebook. 
Libra is to be issued by the Libra Association based in Geneva, 
Switzerland, of which Facebook is a founding member.146 The 
Association’s initial plan was to develop a global payments 
blockchain that facilitates payment in a private stablecoin. The 
 
142. There is evidence of increasing refinement and innovation. See David 
Cerezo Sánchez, Truthful and Faithful Monetary Policy for a Stablecoin Conducted 
by a Decentralised, Encrypted Artificial Intelligence (Sept. 2019), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07445. 
143. See, e.g., Ampleforth, available at https://www.ampleforth.org. 
144. Jamie Redman, Defi Implosion: YAM Token Market Cap Plummets to 
Near Zero Founder After Claims He ‘Failed,’ BITCOIN.COM (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://news.bitcoin.com/defi-yam-token-market-plummets-near-zero-founder-
failed/. 
145. Financial Stability Board, Addressing the Regulatory, Supervisory and 
Oversight Challenges Raised by “Global Stablecoin” Arrangements (Apr. 14, 
2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P140420-1.pdf. 
146. Libra was recently renamed as “Diem.” See The Diem Association, 
Announcing the name Diem. Executive leadership in place in preparation for 
launch, DIEM (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.diem.com/en-us/updates/diem-
association/; see also Nikhilesh De, Libra Rebrands to ‘Diem’ in Anticipation of 
2021 Launch, COINDESK (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/libra-diem-
rebrand. This Article uses the terms Libra and Diem interchangeably. 
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stablecoin would be issued in return for fiat currency that is held in a 
reserve backed by low-risk assets such as deposits and government 
securities in order to ensure each Libra coin would be fully backed 
and stable in value.147 The reserve would be managed by asset 
managers and custodians subject to the Association’s oversight. 
Transactions in Libra would be validated by the founding members 
who are the validator nodes on the blockchain. Despite this set-up 
being a blockchain, it would be centrally managed by the Association, 
which extracts rent from users on an ongoing basis. This would not be 
fully distributed unlike in other private cryptocurrency blockchains. 
The attraction for the dApp economy would be if Libra could be a 
stablecoin programmable with existing blockchain protocol. 
Nevertheless, although Libra is written as open source code and dApp 
developers are welcome to adopt it, they are likely to converge upon 
the programming language for Ethereum as the network effects of the 
Ethereum blockchain merely reinforce these.  Libra is also more likely 
regarded as shackled to the old corporate economy. 
As Facebook is in a position to galvanize 2 billion users to 
participate in Libra, the potential scalability has drawn regulators’ 
attention to it. Financial Stability Board Chair Randall Quarles and 
Bank of England Governor Mark Carney have warned that the use of 
Libra could generate systemic risk,148 a warning that has not been 
aimed at the crypto-economy so far.149 Researchers have modeled the 
potential for stablecoins like Libra to attract substantial inflows of 
retail funds and warn of severe risks to bank funding as well as 
investor protection and financial stability risks if the management of 
stablecoins should experience impaired balance sheets or a liquidity 
 
147. See The Diem Association, Economics and the Reserve, DIEM, 
https://libra.org/en-US/about-currency-reserve/#the_reserve (noting the recent name 
change and that the content of the Libra White Paper v2.0, which was published in 
April 2020, may differ based on regulatory approvals or other considerations, and 
may evolve over time). 
148. Kiran Stacey & Caroline Binham, Global regulators deal blow to 
Facebook’s Libra currency plan, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 25, 2019),  
https://www.ft.com/content/0c1f3832-96b1-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36. 
149. Mark Carney, Letter as Chair of the Financial Stability Board to the G20 
Finance Ministers and Central Bankers (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P180318.pdf. 
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run.150 Coming under enormous regulatory pressure, Facebook has 
tweaked its Libra business model.151 It now proposes to issue Diem 
tokens against major fiat currencies to be used in a permissioned 
payment system across the globe. This may mean that the payment 
system would function more like an international remittance system 
rivaling other social media-based payment systems, such as the 
Chinese WePay. This would make the Diem system more removed 
from being likely to interface with the dApp economy.152 The 
Financial Stability Board153 (“FSB”) has also now explicitly 
encouraged financial regulators all over the world to subject 
stablecoins to regulation, in particular those with large market impact, 
whether by categorizing within existing financial regimes or 
introducing law reform. 
The European Commission has now issued a proposal154 to 
regulate “asset-referenced” stablecoins, treating them as a suis generis 
type of financial product. Their offers would be subject to 
authorization and mandatory disclosure, and issuers are subject to 
prudential requirements and regulatory standards in terms of how 
reserves are managed, audited, disclosed, and how holders’ rights are 
defined and protected. Collateralized stablecoins in the market would 
need to prepare for regulatory compliance and it is uncertain if their 
 
150. Mitsutoshi Adachi et al., A Regulatory and Financial Stability 
Perspective on Global Stablecoins, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/macroprudential-
bulletin/html/ecb.mpbu202005_1~3e9ac10eb1.en.html#toc1. 
151. Hannah Murphy & Izabella Kaminska, Facebook’s Libra overhauls core 
parts of its digital currency vision, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/23a33fcb-1342-4a18-be39-504e8507f752. 
152. Nick Statt, Facebook is shifting its Libra cryptocurrency plans after 
intense regulatory pressure, VERGE (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/3/21163658/facebook-libra-cryptocurrency-
token-ditching-plans-calibra-wallet-delay. 
153. Financial Stability Board, Regulatory, Supervisory and Oversight 
Challenges Raised by “Global Stablecoin” Arrangements (Oct. 13, 2020), 
https://www.fsb.org/2020/10/regulation-supervision-and-oversight-of-global-
stablecoin-arrangements/. 
154. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Markets in Crypto-Assets, and Amending 
Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (Sept. 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/law/200924-crypto-assets-proposal_en.pdf 
[hereinafter European Commission Proposal 2020]. 
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business models would be radically affected, and whether users and 
issuers would find access to collateralized stablecoins too costly. 
The Commission’s proposal purports to capture stablecoins 
collateralized against fiat currencies, commodities, and even crypto-
assets. Popular stablecoins such as Tether, dai, and Diem would be 
affected. To date, the stablecoin with the greatest market 
capitalization155 is Tether collateralized against U.S. dollar and euro 
reserves, and also the Chinese yuan.156 Tether Limited, its issuer 
would need to be authorized and be subject to approval based on a 
number of conditions, in order to make its stablecoin available to 
purchasers from the European Union. These conditions include inter 
alia, regulatory vetting of enterprise governance, repute of 
management and controllers, and continuing regulatory requirements 
in relation to minimum capitalization of at least €2 million or 2 
percent of its reserves, as well as continuing organizational, business 
continuity, holder protection, audit, and complaint handling 
regulations. 
Holders of tether treat it largely as an investment product to hedge 
against bitcoin, and perhaps they may welcome the regulatory 
standards. However, it is queried if issuers can charge an “investment 
management” cost, a revenue model that does not currently exist. 
Tether Limited currently benefits from trades in tether pairs such as on 
its allegedly related Bitfinex crypto-exchange.157 Further, regulating 
asset-referenced stablecoins would adversely affect their potential to 
become a means of payment, as e-money tokens are regulated 
differently and subject to either bank or electronic money issuer 
regulation in the European Union.158 Such a regulatory design is 
arguably aimed at corporatized issuers, like the Diem Association,159 
and based excessively on assumptions regarding the dominance of 
activities of investment management. 
 
155. See Tether, COINMARKETCAP, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether/ (displaying data as of Sept. 27, 2020). 
156. See, e.g., Tether, available at https://tether.to. 
157. Michael Kapilkov, Bitfinex Is Constantly Printing More Tether, None of 
It Has Ever Been Burned, COINTELEGRAPH  (May 27, 2020), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitfinex-is-constantly-printing-more-tether-none-of-
it-has-ever-been-burned. 
158. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154. 
159. See The Diem Association, supra note 147. 
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The Commission’s proposal would pose challenges for dai—a 
stablecoin issued by MakerDAO. Users are able to create dai by 
locking up an amount of ether in a smart contract that creates a vault. 
Dai is a collateralized stablecoin against ether and other Ethereum-
based tokens, soft-pegged against the U.S. dollar.160 In order to 
compensate for the volatility of ether, users need to adjust their levels 
of collateralization based on the ether-USD volatility. Fluctuations in 
ether would mean the need to over-collateralize in order to maintain 
the holdings of dai or else an automated protocol can be triggered to 
liquidate the collateral in the vault. It has been reported that the 
collateralization ratio can be as high as 300 percent.161 However, it 
seems that MakerDAO development of dai is not only as a hedging 
instrument against ether volatility, and its business model seems 
dissimilar from Tether’s which advances trading in pairs and Tether’s 
hedging function. MakerDAO encourages users of dai not to trade in 
and out of dai for speculation, but to hold dai, by saving in an app 
with a savings rate.162 Further, automated protocols stabilize dai 
against speculation by incentivizing nodes to make markets in dai to 
moderate levels of demand.163 As a whole, these aspects advance the 
purposes of dai becoming a trust-building and self-sustaining private 
cryptocurrency. Although its collateralization and stabilization 
protocols are now crucial to its credibility, it can be argued that dai’s 
stability mechanisms premised upon collateralization may be a 
transition phase. It is necessary now for dai to be transformed from 
ether, the productive cryptocurrency of the Ethereum blockchain. 
However, if sufficient dai enter into circulation so that the value of dai 
may be maintained by protocols regarding demand and circulation, 
then the value of collateralization may become moot. This would be 
similar to the uncoupling of established fiat currencies from being 
backed by gold. In sum, dai’s ultimate development could lie in its 
 
160. The Maker Protocol: MakerDAO’s Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) System, 
MAKER FOUNDATION, https://makerdao.com/en/whitepaper#use-of-the-mkr-token-
in-maker-governance. 
161. Amani Moin, Emin Gün Sirer, & Kevin Sekniqi, A Classification 
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adoption as the trusted stable private cryptocurrency on the Ethereum 
blockchain. 
In regulating dai narrowly as a financial asset focused on reserve 
and investment management, and subject to investors’ rights of 
valuation and redemption, regulators are likely to force compliance 
that may undermine the multifaceted features of the stablecoin, such 
as the payment and savings aspects. The European Union’s regulatory 
proposal seems likely to hamper the crypto-economy’s bottom-up 
efforts in developing its monetary order. Further, MakerDAO would 
also face difficulties in securing authorization under the proposal as it 
may not be a legal organizational form recognized in any Member 
State. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”)164 purport 
to be hierarchically flat, governed by automated protocols and do not 
subscribe to a corporate structure. In this manner, the imposition of 
“management-like” duties upon “responsible persons” in the DAO 
may be ill-fitting. 
The regulatory risk for stablecoins pose challenges for their 
seamless adoption in the monetary order of the crypto-economy, 
although well-intentioned investor protection objectives underpin their 
regulation. The FSB’s announcement and the European Union’s 
regulatory proposal show that regulatory attention is very much 
focused on the stablecoin as a financial product and emphasis is 
placed on the familiar financial risks that entail from the selling, 
conduct of business, risk management, and governance aspects 
relating to the stablecoin. Hence, the stablecoin is not looked at in 
terms of its functions in the dApp economy. This narrow approach to 
stablecoins would unlikely resolve the needs of the dApp economy in 
terms of its monetary order.165 
In light of the regulatory risks that surround private stablecoins, it 
may be argued that developing a digitally programmable fiat currency 
for the dApp economy may be the preferred way forward. In the 
United States, two registered money service businesses Circle and 
Coinbase, which is also a cryptocurrency exchange, have launched a 
 
164. Christopher Jentzsch, The History of the DAO and Lessons Learned, 
SLOCK.IT BLOG (Aug. 24, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/the-history-of-the-dao-and-
lessons-learned-d06740f8cfa5; see also Ori Oren, ICO’s, DAO’S, and the SEC: A 
Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 619 (2018). 
165. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Pathways to European Policy and 
Regulation in the Crypto-economy, 10 EUR. J. RISK & REG. 738 (2019). 
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“USD Coin,” i.e., a digital version of the U,S. dollar to be fully 
programmable in blockchain-based applications.166 This could 
arguably be the ultimate stablecoin for the U.S. market or even the 
global market, given the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar. 
However, such a digital currency is likely the equivalent of electronic 
money in the European Union,167 and the soundness of the USD Coin 
depends on the solvency of the issuer as it is a claim upon the issuer. 
CBDC would be superior in quality to privately issued electronic fiat 
money. 
It can be queried whether algorithmically-managed stablecoins 
may be the way forward for the dApp economy to implement a private 
means of cryptocurrency payment that remains unregulated but is able 
to meet users’ needs in terms of monetary qualities. Under the E.U. 
Commission’s proposal, algorithmically-managed stablecoins would 
unlikely fall within the stringent regulatory regime for asset-
referenced stablecoins, but their offers may need to comply with offer 
regulation which demands mandatory disclosure in a white paper. 
Such regulation would however not be a regime of continuous 
investment management regulation, like that imposed on asset-
referenced stablecoin issuers. This Article is sceptical that 
algorithmically-managed stablecoins may be able to meet users’ 
needs’. In order to meet users’ needs of monetary stability, even if it is 
relative and not absolute stability, we may turn to major global 
currencies to discern the underpinnings for their relative stability.168 
Major global currencies are managed by central banks, many of which 
are committed to price stability, even if their mandates can be 
influenced by policy needs from time to time.169 This is largely due to 
 
166. See, e.g., Circle, available at https://www.circle.com/en/#. 
167. Electronic Money Directive, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC 
[hereinafter E.U. Electronic Money Directive]. 
168. Mark Sobel, Major foreign exchange pairs hold steady, OFFICIAL 
MONETARY & FINANCIAL INST. FORUM (OMFIF) (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.omfif.org/2020/05/major-foreign-exchange-pairs-hold-steady/. 
169. See generally Jeffrey A. Frieden, Real Sources of European Currency 
Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration, 56 INT’L 
ORGANISATION 831 (2002). 
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the underpinnings of free and open trading, usually in large, deep, and 
liquid markets. Although currency trading has been dogged by 
manipulation scandals,170 swift enforcement,171 and the forces of 
broad and liquid markets, trading provides balance to the price 
formation of major global currencies. A key risk in the price formation 
for algorithmically-managed cryptocurrency is whether and how the 
underpinnings for stability management may be manipulated. In the 
case of Ampleforth, for example, the purported relative stability of the 
coin is maintained by reflecting demand side information. It is 
questioned whether demand side information can be manipulated, 
especially by large holders, whose incentives in using these tokens, for 
example as swap assets, could affect their demand behavior. Market 
manipulation, even in large and deep securities markets, is often 
regulated by prohibitive standards and regulatory enforcement.172 If 
algorithmically-managed cryptocurrencies are neither supported by 
large and liquid trading markets or the regulation of market 
manipulation, their credibility may not be scalable. However, it is a 
chicken-and-egg problem for such cryptocurrencies, as large and 
liquid trading markets for them are generally developed after they are 
able to achieve scalability and widespread adoption. 
Although the European Union’s proposal to regulate asset-
referenced cryptoassets would not apply to algorithmically-managed 
stablecoins, hence sparing them of the onerous obligations akin to 
investment management regulation, all cryptoassets offered in the 
European Union would be subject to public offer and mandatory 
disclosure regulation.173 In particular, mandatory disclosure is 
required of the technological protocols and how they work, in relation 
 
170. Sebastian Chrispin, Forex scandal: How to rig the market, BBCNEWS 
(May 20, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905. 
171. Daniel Schäfer, Caroline Binham & Kara Scannell, Regulators slap 
$4.3bn fines on six banks in global forex probe, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/aa812316-69be-11e4-9f65-00144feabdc0. 
172. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and 
repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, art. 12 
(focusing on strict liability for effects caused by abnormal trading practices) 
[hereinafter E.U. Market Abuse Regulation 2014]; see also Winterflood 
Securities Ltd & Ors v The Financial Services Authority [2010] EWCA Civ 423. 
173. See infa Part III, Section C, subd. (2). 
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to framing the expectations and rights of users. It is queried whether 
algorithmically-managed stablecoins may be susceptible to complex 
programming that needs to be adjusted during development, and are 
less susceptible to either comprehensive disclosure (which jeopardizes 
regulatory compliance with the cryptoasset offer regulations) or may 
attract investors’ ex post litigation for deviations, even if made with 
good intentions as part of code development. The European Union’s 
fitting of algorithmically-managed stablecoins within a general 
cryptoasset definition that caters more for utility-type tokens poses 
regulatory hazards for these coins. At this juncture, this Article doubts 
that algorithmically-managed stablecoins would provide the ultimate 
privately-driven solution to the dApp economy’s monetary order. 
In this light, CBDC can be considered in terms of its enabling 
effect in the dApp economy, in relation to providing dApp developers 
and users with a choice that mitigates their financial risk and is 
supportive of the dApp economy’s development. This would be 
premised upon partnership between the public and private sector, such 
as with Ethereum developers, in developing CBDC’s 
programmability. 
Some dApp developers may, however, hold the view that the 
dApp economy should not be integrated with the mainstream 
economy and should be “sovereign resistant.”174 DApp developers 
may prefer an “anarcho-capitalist ethos”175 that allows them to carve 
out an economic space unshackled from conventional economic, legal, 
political, and social institutions.176 In this manner, the issuance of a 
CBDC programmable for the dApp economy may be unwelcome as 
the dApp economy may be perceived to be a space described by 
Schrepel177 as deliberately designed to facilitate choice for those who 
wish not to be subject to the rule of law. However, this may not be a 
universal view held in all quarters. First, in a survey of token offerings 
made by dApp developers, it mentions that developers could offer a 
 
174. Brady Dale, Libra Scales Back Global Currency Ambitions in Concession 
to Regulators, COINDESK (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/libra-scales-
back-global-currency-ambitions-in-concession-to-regulators. 
175. See generally Flood & Robb, supra note 5. 
176. See generally Schrepel, supra note 4. 
177. Id. 
42
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/12
 2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021  9:44 AM 
2021] CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY FOR THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY 295 
choice of acceptance in fiat or cryptocurrency.178 This demonstrates 
that some developers would like to appeal more broadly to 
investors.179 Second, the popularity of collateralized stablecoins 
against fiat currencies reflects the underlying need of dApp developers 
to mitigate cryptocurrency volatility and the adverse impact on them. 
The reliance on leading fiat currencies reflects the inherent 
unsustainability in simple resistance against conventional institutions. 
In putting to the test the win-win proposal for dApp developers and 
central banks keen on implementing a CBDC, this Article proposes 
that a limited rollout to enable CBDC to support investment in the 
dApp economy is an appropriate first step. We would be able to 
observe at least the following effects for further development: (1) the 
effects of CBDC upon payment competition in the dApp economy; (2) 
mainstream demand for investment and consumption in the dApp 
economy; (3) the integration of the crypto-economy into the 
mainstream; and (4) the levels of growth in dApp enterprises and of 
what types. 
The market-based governance of the dApp economy is unlikely to 
foster a solution to its monetary order that would appeal broadly to 
social trust. Social trust is more effectively supported by institutional 
qualities beyond merely market-based governance. We argue that 
CBDC mediates the institutional connection to the dApp economy that 
is needed for its further development and mobilization. The trajectory 
towards growth, development, and mobilization in the dApp economy 
is an inevitable one as more prosumers are keen to join the space. In 
this manner, it would be increasingly untenable for this space to be 
fringe and unregulated, institutionally disembodied or incompatible. If 
a household experiments with culinary exploits and treats its private 
members and neighbors, it may be ad hoc and unregulated. But where 
it gains popularity and scale, and its culinary exploits are accessed by 
more and on a regular basis, it would be untenable not to consider if it 
should be recognized as a restaurant, therefore needing to conduct 
itself with a measure of institutionally expected standards of safety 
and hygiene. In an analogous manner, the fringe and experimental 
 
178. Sabrina Howell, Marina Niesser & David Yermack, Initial Coin 
Offerings: Financing Growth With Cryptocurrency Token Sales, NAT’L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RES. (Sept. 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24774. 
179. Id. 
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nature of the dApp economy has progressed to a point of significant 
growth and development, and maturation would likely be facilitated 
by reconciling with institutional framing. We argue that issuing 
CBDC for the specific purpose of investment in the dApp economy is 
a crucial starting point. By situating the policy for CBDC within a 
broader theoretical framework of regulatory capitalism, it explains the 
need for any capitalist order that is well-functioning to be governed 
appropriately. 
D. CBDCs as Lynchpin for the Development of the DApp Economy: 
The Paradigm of Regulatory Capitalism 
The broader theoretical framework for the role of CBDCs is 
regulatory capitalism, which explains why apparently free-market or 
private sector-led activity is inextricably connected with and 
underpinned by public sector institutions, notably institutions of law 
and regulation. The scaling up, mobilization, and galvanization of the 
dApp economy needs social acceptance and penetration into the 
mainstream. Public sector institutions, such as the legal tender status 
of the CBDC, are able to provide facilitative support and regulative 
underpinnings that are essential for social trust. 
In the history of Anglo-American capitalism, the promotion of 
free and liberal markets is seen to be necessary for individual 
freedoms and success, but free markets have been underpinned by 
regulatory capitalism. “Regulatory capitalism” is defined as a 
symbiotic division of “labor” between the state and the private sector 
where the role of the state in economic policy is that of “steering” 
while the private sector is responsible for “rowing.”180 Rowing depicts 
the work of actual service provision and technological innovation that 
is carried out by the private sector as commercial and business 
activity, while steering refers to setting policy in order to influence, 
govern, or incentivize behavior or output in relation to rowing.181 The 
objectives of regulation are to steer away from the problems that 
unbridled markets give rise to, such as market failures and providing 
collective goods.  Such intervention nevertheless supports markets so 
 
180. See David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 
598 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
12 (2005); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM (2008). 
181. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 180. 
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that they can work optimally. Regulatory capitalism arguably provides 
a theoretical underpinning for the building of the European Single 
Market too, opined by some as a neo-liberal project but crucially 
embedding the unique ordoliberal ethos182 that places the flourishing 
of innovative economic activity within social order and well-being. 
In this manner, policy and design of regulation for the dApp 
economy is targeted at integrating such economic developments 
within an institutional fabric. This does not mean that a “coherentist” 
approach183 is taken in reconciling, interpreting or extending existing 
bodies of law and regulation to the dApp economy however ill-fitting, 
such an approach being counterproductive to the building up of this 
economic sphere and facilitating its orderly development. The 
recognition that policy is needed for steering the rowing activities of 
the dApp economy means that we can consider its needs as the 
starting point for the establishment of appropriate legal institutional 
architecture. This starting point in no way ensures that legal or 
regulatory outcomes are final and not experimental. As Michèle Finck 
argues,184 legal innovation is often necessary to accompany significant 
technological innovation and disruption. 
It is acknowledged, however, that regulators often approach an 
innovation with their “baggage” of assumptions that have been 
applied to existing industry business models, processes, or products. 
This may be due to an unchanging mandate or scope of jurisdiction 
conferred upon regulators, compelling regulators to fit innovations 
within their ontologies, rather than to determine if sufficient novelty 
has developed to warrant different taxonomies and approaches.185 It is 
arguable that the spirit of regulatory capitalism is not shackled to such 
incremental assumptions. As Cristie Ford argues, innovation can be 
“sedimentary” or  “seismic,” referring to the scale of different, impact 
of change, and structural effects that types of innovation can bring 
 
182. See generally ORDOLIBERALISM, LAW AND THE RULE OF ECONOMICS 
(Josef Hien & Christian Joerges eds., 2017) (discussing ordoliberal ethos). 
183. See ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 191–196 
(2019) (referring to a legal mindset that seeks to first fit new phenomena within the 
frameworks of existing legal ontologies). 
184. See generally Michèle Finck, Blockchains: Regulating the Unknown, 19 
GERMAN L.J. 665 (2018). 
185. See Syren Johnstone, Taxonomies of Digital Assets: Recursive or 
Progressive, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L & POL’Y 1 (2019). 
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about for the economy and society.186 Regulators need to be able to 
respond to either and a “coherentist” approach is not assumed in 
furthering regulatory capitalism. 
Other scholars argue that innovation often entails “boundary” 
challenges for law and regulation as unregulated entities perform the 
equivalent of regulated activities or regulated entities undertake new 
and unregulated activities, raising questions for an appropriate 
institutional response.187 In the dApp economy, there is also potential 
“smashing” of boundaries as unregulated entities undertake new and 
innovative unregulated activities which nevertheless attract concerns 
in relation to how the commons of such activities need to be 
governed.188 Hence, the theoretical location of the dApp economy in 
regulatory capitalism does not mean the stultification of innovation by 
the extension of stale laws or regulations to novel phenomena. Rather, 
an opportunity arises for new negotiation of the social contract 
regarding the integration of this space into the social and economic 
fabric. 
Next, we turn to the mechanics of introducing the CBDC in the 
dApp economy using the central bank digital euro as a proposed 
experiment in the European Single Market. 
III. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL EURO AS AN EXPERIMENT FOR LIMITED 
ROLLOUT IN THE DAPP ECONOMY OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 
The most significant economic activity in the dApp economy is 
fundraising for dApp development projects, known as “initial coin 
offerings” (“ICOs”). Developers of a dApp business project typically 
offer tokens in return for cryptocurrency from supporters. These are 
the application tokens envisaged to be used on the dApp when the 
 
186. See CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, 
AND JUSTICE 166–236 (2017). 
187. See, e.g., Charles A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 705 (2010). 
188. A commons is relevant for blockchain-based networks as there may be 
collective goods apart from the protocols relating to transaction validation and 
ledger construction that require addressing, such as dispute resolution. See Sinclair 
Davidson, Primavera De Fillippi & Jason Potts, Blockchain and the Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639 (2018). See generally 
ELINOR OSTRÖM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
46
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/12
 2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021  9:44 AM 
2021] CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY FOR THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY 299 
project finally goes live. Token offerings are “pre-incorporation” in 
nature, meaning that they are held ahead of any business development. 
The fundraising is premised upon a business idea and developers’ 
plans as to how the idea should be technologically executed. This is a 
novel point in time for business fundraising, as securities fundraising 
is usually premised upon a degree of maturity of the company and 
even venture-capitalists that fund start-up stages are facing usually an 
already-incorporated company with perhaps some initial operations.189   
Tokens confer a variety of consideration in return for supporters’ 
funds. For example, utility tokens confer on subscribers a future right 
to use or enjoy certain services,190 and resemble a pre-sale of yet-to-
exist rights or services. However, these come in a different variety in 
terms of whether they may be user-based, or include other 
participation rights.191 “Fun” tokens may confer a benefit to the 
community at large or to another without consideration.192 Investment 
tokens confer on subscribers a right to participate in a form of 
investment and risk being classified as falling foul of existing 
financial markets or securities regulation.193 
The pre-sale of tokens comes close to resembling established 
practices for corporate fundraising, which is regulated under many 
jurisdictions’ securities regulation regimes. However, it can be argued 
 
189. Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARVARD BUS. REV. (1998), 
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works (noting the relative rarity of 
venture capital funds investing in start-up and very young stages of companies); 
Dirk Engel & Max Keilbach, Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture Capital 
Investment — An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FINANCE 150 (2007). 
190. Zider, supra note 189. 
191. See generally Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings 
under U.S. Law,’ 46 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 405 (2019). 
192. Dirk Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, it’s a Bubble, it’s a 
Super Challenge for Regulators (University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper 
No. 11/2017, UNSW Law. Res. Paper No. 17–83, University of Hong Kong Faculty 
of Law Res. Paper No. 2017/035, European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 
18/2018, Harvard Int’l L.J. Vol. 63, No.2, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3072298. 
193. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (July 
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter 
SEC Report]; SEC Guidance 2018, supra note 91. 
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that ICOs are a different beast altogether,194 and such pre-sales are 
necessary in order to generate interest in and support for the project 
under development, which would ultimately become a distributed 
marketplace dependent on network effects.195  Such pre-sales may 
also co-opt users into a space of co-developing the experimental 
software for the blockchain-based business in order to fix its bugs and 
refine it for ultimate launch.196 Most developers insist that such sales 
are characterized as sales of future goods or services.197 Needless to 
say, the investor protection concerns in this phenomenon have drawn 
securities regulators’ attention to the area.198 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has in 
particular taken a stringent approach to classifying most token offers 
as securities offers.199 The European Commission has also proposed to 
treat offers of crypto-assets as financial assets that should be subject to 
a regime of mandatory disclosure and civil liability for misleading or 
false information.200  The advent of regulatory treatment of this area 
makes it timely for thinking about a different way forward. The 
regulatory approaches may be regarded as being too path-dependent 
on assumptions and approaches appropriate for different business 
models and products. There is arguably insufficient consideration of 
 
194. Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, 
Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law, 15 EUROPEAN CO. & 
FINANCIAL L. REV. 645 (2018); Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, Ain’t Misbehavin’: An 
Examination of Broadway Tickets and Blockchain Tokens, 65 WAYNE L. REV 81 
(2019). 
195. Wulf A. Kaal, Crypto-Economics- The Top 100 Token Models Compared 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249860. 
196. Saman Adhami, Giancarlo Giudici & Stefano Martinazzi, Why do 
Businesses Go Crypto? An Empirical Analysis of Initial Coin Offerings, 100 J. 
ECON. & BUS.64 (2018) (noting that these types of ICOs are most likely to succeed). 
197. See, e.g., The SAFT Project, available at https://saftproject.com/ 
(“SAFT,” or Simple Agreement for Future Tokens,  has been developed as a 
template for ICO offerings clarifying that sales are of tokens for future use); see also 
Jiri Chod & Evgeny Lyandres, A Theory of ICOs: Diversification, Agency, and 
Information Asymmetry’ (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159528. 
198. Iris H-Y Chiu, Decrypting the Trends of International Regulatory 
Competition in Crypto-finance, 7 EUR. J. COMP. L. & GOVERNANCE 297 (2020) 
(comparing securities regulators’ responses to token offerings in a range of different 
jurisdictions). 
199. SEC Guidance 2018, supra note 91. 
200. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154. 
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the pre-development nature of token sales and the likely unsuitability 
of a mandatory disclosure regime for regulation, premised upon 
assumptions that all information is clear and conveyable to potential 
investors. Further, although the European Commission purports to 
mobilize crypto-asset offers by allowing developers to market offers 
across the European Union if they comply with the regulation, there is 
little thought in whether such mobilization would work if investors 
need to access private cryptocurrency to engage with the offers. 
Hence, what is missing is arguably regulatory thinking for an enabling 
institution that bridges investors’ with dApp developers’ needs. 
Drawing upon the theoretical framing of regulatory capitalism allows 
us not only to think of the regulative aspects of the dApp economy as 
a new economic order but also the enabling aspects in law and 
regulation.201 This Article proposes that a key enabling institution is a 
starting and limited issuance of CBDC as tokens in exchange for 
investors’ cash, for the specific channeling of investment to dApp 
developers raising finance for project development. 
This limited proposal serves a few objectives. First, it is poised to 
map demand possibly at uneven levels across the euro area for CBDC 
in relation to the dApp economy. Second, it supports and mobilizes 
policy thinking on the “securities regulation” of token offerings, but 
not in a siloed manner, as relevant regulators and the central bank 
could take advantage of such an intersection to engage in interagency 
dialogue and knowledge exchange with each other, ultimately 
supporting the evolution of new institutional responses or 
architecture.202  Third, as dApp developments are aimed towards 
becoming a live business, the facilitative role of CBDC for investment 
into the crypto-economy brings about further intersections with a 
wider mosaic of business and commercial law and regulation, in order 
to serve wider economic facilitation purposes as well as regulative 
purposes. In other words, the starting point of CBDC as facilitating 
investment into a predevelopment dApp economy galvanizes and 
mobilizes the policy mosaic for the dApp economy. 
This Article proposes that CBDC should be issued in a token-
based design for a limited rollout. CBDC should be issued as digital 
 
201. See generally Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J.  
REGULATION ONLINE 1 (2012). 
202. See infra Part III, Section C, subd. (4). 
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tokens against physical or digital cash tendered by individuals for the 
purposes of investing in the crypto-economy. In this manner, the 
public sector provides the facilitating institution of the CBDC while 
the private sector provides both the opportunities for dApp economy 
investment and the rise of private sector industries such as token 
custodial services that would implement the limited rollout policy. It 
is envisaged that such service providers would be subject to 
regulation, as discussed below. 
CBDC should not be issued under an account-based design in the 
limited rollout proposal. In an account-based design, the central bank 
would have to provide a fundamentally new service akin to a 
brokerage account for investors, raising issues of customer-protection 
roles as custodial agents and brokerage functions vis-á-vis dApp 
issuers. Further, as the CBDC should be an enabling mechanism for 
dApp economy investment, it is best that such investment interfaces 
be provided by private sector services so that the investing public may 
not confused as to the central bank’s role and mistakenly treat the 
central bank as warranting the quality of such investments. In this 
manner, the limited rollout proposal also supports the European 
Commission’s overall policy of building out a pan-European digital 
market, especially in terms of capital formation. In playing a 
mobilizing role for the dApp economy, the limited rollout of CBDC 
supports the building of the dApp economy within the Commission’s 
new action plan for the Capital Markets Union.203 In this new action 
plan, the Digital Finance Package204 is a building block to help small 
and medium sized enterprises gain access to fundraising outside of the 
traditional bank finance channels, while at the same time promoting 
digital transformation in the Single Market. 
In a token-based design, an investor would have to show that the 
exchange for CBDC is for investment purposes, and custodial agents 
would hold issued CBDC on trust for their respective account-holders 
in order to commit the funds to regulated dApp issues. These custodial 
services can generate the public and private key pairs for each 
investor’s account and receive CBDC credited by the central bank for 
 
203. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 76. 
204. See European Commission, Communication: Digital Finance Package 
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/200924-digital-finance-
proposals_en [hereinafter Digital Finance Package]. 
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investors’ tendered cash. They then facilitate the investment 
transactions for investors. They would also be tasked with the 
functions of anti-money laundering due diligence, custodial 
safekeeping, and transfer for investments to be made. In such a set-up, 
central banks would be relieved of direct service provision and some 
of the onerous implications, but there should be overall regulatory 
policy to subject custodial services to regulation and supervision.205 
In this manner, custodial agents also act like brokers, which 
makes such a role unique and different from conventional financial 
intermediaries. These service providers are envisaged to have 
custodial, payment and brokerage functions; yet bundled in new ways. 
They would also have responsibilities engaging with central banks, 
investors, and the relevant dApp issuers. Custodial providers in the 
private sector need to develop the requisite cryptographic expertise 
and customer service interfaces. Expertise can be developed from 
current wallet providers for cryptocurrencies. Existing payment 
services institutions may also see the market opportunity to foray into 
providing these services and many of them are already overseen by 
national central banks in the euro area.206 Regulatory and supervision 
implications would arise, but alongside new business opportunities 
and innovation. 
The proposal above clearly shows that where the CBDC paves the 
way as an enabling mechanism in investing in the dApp economy, 
other regulatory policy issues are engaged, such as subjecting 
custodial agents to regulatory supervision and standards. The 
 
205. See, e.g., Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), art.16(8) (describing 
organizational requirements including custodial regulation) [hereinafter E.U. 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2014)]. 
206. The European Banking Authority maintains a register of national central 
banks that also authorize and oversee payment services providers under the Payment 
Services Directive. The primary responsibility of national central banks in payments 
regulation and supervision is described as based on an intergovernmental ethos of 
power and responsibility in the European Union, such that payment oversight power 
is not concentrated in the ECB. See Dermot Hodson, De Novo Bodies and the New 
Intergovernmentalism: The Case of the European Central Bank, in THE NEW 
INTERGOVERNMENTALISM: STATES AND SUPRANATIONAL ACTORS IN THE POST-
MAASTRICHT ERA (Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson & Uwe Puetter eds., 
2015). 
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regulatory policy agenda can thus be “built out” more holistically, 
integrating the investment, commercial and financial needs of the 
crypto-economy. This is a more optimal vision of outworking for 
regulatory capitalism in the dApp economy than an incremental 
approach that seeks minimal disruption with existing regulatory 
ontologies. 
In this manner, it may be criticized that the European 
Commission’s proposals to regulate crypto-asset offerings and service 
providers are too limited and draw excessively from existing 
regulatory frameworks without necessarily providing a good fit with 
crypto-economy needs. Crypto-asset offerings would be regulated via 
the mandatory disclosure of a prescribed white paper, subject to 
investor civil litigation for false or misleading disclosure. “Crypto-
assets” are defined as a digital representation of value or rights, with 
reference to electronic storage and transfer via distributed ledger 
technology. The Commission established three regulatory regimes for 
crypto-assets, and a regime for “crypto-asset service providers” in 
general. Crypto-assets that are collateralized stablecoins, or “asset-
referenced, as well as those that electronically reference fiat 
currencies, or known as “e-money” tokens are regulated differently 
from the rest of crypto-assets. 
Crypto-assets other than “asset-referenced” or “e-money” crypto-
assets can be publicly offered across the European Union, regulated 
by way of legal entity registration in any Member State and the 
publication of a prescribed white paper, which contains mandatory 
disclosure. However, exemptions are made for offers not exceeding €1 
million in 12 months, or made to a small number of natural person 
investors not exceeding 150, or made to professional investors only. If 
the crypto-assets are obtained by gratuitous helicopter drops, or by 
mining, or are unique and non-fungible in nature, they are not subject 
to the public offer regulatory regime. 
As many ICOs raise over €1 million,207 the low threshold for 
exemption is unlikely useful for many dApp developers. Although the 
prescribed white paper is less onerous than the well-developed 
 
207. Kate Rooney, A blockchain start-up just raised $4 billion without a live 
product, CNBC (May 31, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/a-blockchain-
start-up-just-raised-4-billion-without-a-live-product.html. 
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mandatory disclosure regime of prospectus disclosure for securities,208 
the categories of transparency required are ideologically derived from 
such established regimes, i.e., in relation to developers’ information, 
legal entity information, or information regarding rights of holders, 
among others. The mandatory disclosure regime is accompanied by 
market discipline in terms of civil responsibility for inaccurate or 
misleading disclosure. For pre-development dApps where the 
information environment is tentative, this can be an onerous obligation 
subjecting developers to significant legal risk. 
Crypto-asset service providers would be regulated under an 
umbrella category, subject to prudential requirements, mandatory 
insurance support, general rules of conduct of business— such as fair 
treatment of customers and management of conflicts of interest—as 
well as organizational and governance requirements pertaining to 
business continuity and cybersecurity. There is a lack of thinking as to 
what manners of service providers, especially novel ones may arise in 
the dApp economy, and a blanket extension of conduct regulation may 
not be appropriate, especially if these service providers have no direct 
dealing with users or may be decentralized in governance. 
The proposed regulatory approach outlined above shows that the 
European Union may embark on regulating the financial and payment 
aspects of the crypto-economy in a manner highly derived from 
existing regulation and in a siloed manner, ignoring the commercial 
and economic contexts of the crypto-economy. Hence, this Article 
argues for a different regulatory policy approach that should first be 
focused on enabling economic development, accompanied by 
appropriate governance. This Article also suggests that the CBDC can 
fulfill such an enabling function and pave the way for developing a 
broader framework of governance in engagement with dApp economy 
participants. 
It may be queried why CBDC is needed as private e-money 
providers can issue programmable digital fiat currencies for 
investment or payment in the dApp economy, such as the USD Coin 
issued by registered money service business Circle in the United 
States. The USD Coin is fully programmable in Ethereum blockchain-
 
208. See Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing 
Directive 2003/71/EC, art. 6 [hereinafter Prospectus Regulation]. 
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based applications.209 The European Commission’s proposal, 
however, treats such an issuance as e-money regulated under bank or 
electronic money issuer regulations,210 therefore ignoring the potential 
of integration into the dApp economy, or at least failing to account for 
such integration and regulatory implications. Moreover, CBDC would 
be programmed and “signed” by the ESCB and is not a claim upon a 
private sector issuer (which is what privately issued electronic money 
amounts to) whose risk of insolvency the recipient runs. It may 
nevertheless be argued that as e-money issuers are regulated 
prudentially, the risk faced by customers of issuer failure is small. 
However, despite prudential regulation, if we rely on e-money 
creation by the private sector for the limited rollout proposal, e-money 
providers can engage in leverage generation211 for speculative instead 
of genuine investment purposes, and may fuel bubbles in token prices. 
The limited rollout of CBDC for investment can galvanize 
development in the dApp economy and bring us a step closer towards 
the institutional interface between the dApp economy and the 
mainstream economy. Such an enabling role for the CBDC must, 
however, be accompanied by more holistic and complex thinking in 
relation to substantive regulation and regulatory architecture. Before 
this Article turns to these issues, it will briefly canvass the legal 
mandate for the central bank is able to accommodate CBDCs. It will 
argue that the legal mandate for the ESCB is able to accommodate the 
limited rollout proposal in the euro area. This is appropriate for an 
experimental rollout and there is also empirical evidence regarding 
dApp development interest in the euro area.212 
A. The Legal Framework for Issuance of CBDC for the Euro Area 
The ECB has the exclusive right to issue euro banknotes as legal 
tender in the euro-area.213 In practice, national central banks (“NCB”) 
 
209. See Circle, supra note 166. 
210. See generally E.U. Electronic Money Directive, supra note 167. 
211. Id. art. 6 (noting credit creation can be undertaken by electronic money 
institutions). 
212. Fromberger & Haffke, supra note 95. 
213. European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty for the Functioning 
of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, OJ L. 326/47-326/390 art. 128, available at 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/52303e8d4.html [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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undertake such issue subject to the ECB’s approval, as the ECB has 
limited institutional facilities for organizing banknote production and 
distribution.214 In relation to coins, NCBs are primarily responsible for 
issuing them.215 This system ensures that although the ECB has 
centralized authority over the monetary functions in the euro area, 
decentralized implementation is carried out based on the existing 
institutional facilities as being most practical and efficient. 
It may be queried whether the issuance of digital euros should be 
regarded as “banknotes” or “coins.” One also notes that tokens issued 
by dApp developers in fundraising have also been called “coins.” The 
difference between banknotes and coins in Article 128 of the Treaty 
for the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) relates to 
difference in denomination. This difference in denomination is 
meaningful as the physical representation of notes and coins differ. 
Physical representation is currently differentiated according to 
denomination, i.e., banknote for €5 and above in terms of 
denomination, and coin for €2 and below.216 Where digital currency is 
concerned, the digitalization of form cuts across the need for 
differentiating between denominations and consequent production. 
Although the use of language reflects the assumption of physical 
representation, it is arguable, on a teleological basis,217 that the digital 
versions of euros would still fall to be interpreted as digital euro 
banknotes or coins depending on denomination.  Article 128 can be 
interpreted teleologically as including physical as well as digital 
 
214. See generally CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKING 
LAW: THE ROLE OF THE ECB AND NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS UNDER EUROPEAN 
LAW 281–329 (2020); Martin Seidel, The Constitutional Design of the European 
Central Bank (CESifo DICE Report, 2012), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/167064/1/ifo-dice-report-v10-y2012-i1-
p14-20.pdf. 
215. TFEU, supra note 213, art. 128(2). 
216. See Decision of the European Central Bank of 19 April 2013 on the 
denominations, specifications, reproduction, exchange and withdrawal of euro 
banknotes (recast) (ECB/2013/10) (2013/211/EU), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013D0010 [hereinafter European Central 
Bank Decision]. 
217. Frank Elderson, Legal Interpretation within the ESCB: Is there Method in 
It?, in LIBER AMICORUM & PAOLO ZAMBONI GARAVELLI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 235–257 (European Central Bank, 2005). 
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representations of the same subject matter.218 However, within the 
confines of the TFEU, it is arguably not possible to treat digital 
currency issued by the central bank as a species outside of “banknote” 
or “coin.” 
The express competence for minting coins on the part of NCBs 
may constrain the interpretation of Article 128, meaning that there is 
only scope for the ECB to directly issue CBDC in denominations of 
€5 and above. However, as banknote denomination is a policy decided 
by the ECB,219 the policy to denominate €5 and above in the form of 
banknote can be reconsidered by the ECB. It is also possible for the 
ECB to issue separate decisions for denominations of physical 
banknotes and coins, alongside digital banknotes and coins,220 with 
the digital banknote having a lower range of denominations than the 
physical range. It can be questioned whether digital banknotes can be 
denominated in low ranges, phasing out coins entirely. This is 
permissible under the TFEU as coin issuance seems discretionary for 
NCBs. Further as Article 128 envisages that both the ECB and NCBs 
can issue banknotes under the ECB’s authorization, defining lower 
ranges of denominations for digital banknotes does not adversely 
affect competence between the ECB and NCBs. The potential 
issuance of low-denominated digital banknote euros would also meet 
the needs of the crypto-economy as many tokens trade in secondary 
markets in fractions of a U.S. dollar. 
Although digital banknotes can be defined in lower denomination 
ranges and can equally be issued by the ECB directly or by NCBs, this 
Article supports a decentralized system where NCBs could be the 
primary issuers, subject to the overall oversight and approval of the 
ECB, in relation to the broader policy relating to issuing CBDC in the 
limited rollout proposal. This would also entail little change in 
 
218. See Nabilou, supra note 44. 
219. European Central Bank Decision, supra note 216. 
220. Cf. Advocate General Giovanni Pitruzzella’s opinion in Advocate 
General’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-422/19 Press and Information Johannes 
Dietrich and C-423/19 Norbert Häring v Hessischer Rundfunk (arguably supporting 
separate provision for the CBDC and its status as legal tender); see also Press 
Release No. 119/20, Court of Justice of the European Union, According to Advocate 
General Pitruzzella, EU law provides that creditors have an obligation in principle to 
accept cash in euros for the payment of monetary debts (Sept. 29, 2020), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-09/cp200119en.pdf. 
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practice from the present dominant role of NCBs issuing physical 
banknotes and coins. 
It may be queried whether by analogy with electronic money, 
CBDC is therefore not ‘“legal tender.” Although the Electronic 
Money Directive provides for  recognition and regulation of electronic 
money without specifying legal tender, scholars argue that the implicit 
assumption of the Directive is that it must deal with legally recognized 
currencies in the European Union on the basis of the assumptions of 
stable value made in the Directive and the obligations issuers are 
imposed with in relation to the exchange or redemption of electronic 
money.221 Whether CBDC is technically legal tender would unlikely 
affect its favorable perception at a practical level. The advantage of 
legal tender is that creditors are obliged to accept legal tender in 
discharge of a debt. This advantage is not highly applicable in the 
context of the limited rollout proposal. In the investment context, 
investors make an offer to buy tokens which issuers accept, and 
issuers are free to set conditions of acceptance such as payment by 
CBDC or other cryptocurrency. CBDC issuance should be geared 
towards incentivizing not forcing its adoption. However, if a policy 
choice to make CBDC indisputably legal tender is made, in view of 
the ECB’s interest in rolling out more widely for e-commerce and 
retail payment, it becomes more imperative for the ECB to consider 
issuing a decision on the denominations of digital banknotes so that 
lower ranges can meet the definition of “legal tender” under the 
TFEU. 
B. Institutional Structure for Issuance of CBDC in the European 
System of Central Banks 
Although the ECB has exclusive competence to issue euro 
“banknotes,” and we argue that digital banknotes can be defined to be 
in lower denomination ranges, in practice, the ECB and NCBs work 
closely together in issuing euro banknotes, and NCBs undertake much 
of the issue anyway. This Article argues that it is structurally optimal 
for NCBs to take on the primary responsibility for issuing CBDC. 
 
221. Anton N. Didenko & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Currency: Cash 
to Cryptos to Sovereign Digital Currencies, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1041 (2019). 
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At a decentralized level, NCBs may face different levels of 
demand for CBDC as there is an uneven level of interest and 
participation in the dApp economy across Europe. Although the dApp 
economy spans global borders, developers commonly start as a 
socially close-knit group in particular geographically-precise 
locations,222 such as the Silicon Valley in the United States. In 
Europe, Switzerland, Germany, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom 
are highly popular jurisdictions where token offerings have been 
based,223  and other euro area countries such as France and Spain are 
popular too. In this manner, due to different levels of demand across 
the euro area, NCBs can be well-placed to discover locally-generated 
needs. Further, the limited rollout proposal supports investment in the 
dApp economy and regulatory oversight of this is carried out by 
national agencies dealing with capital formation and investment 
regulation. There is no pan-European investment markets regulator, as 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is a body 
overseeing and coordinating national regulators who remain at the 
forefront of regulatory tasks.  NCBs can work with national securities 
regulators in mapping the developments in the dApp economy and 
developing regulatory policy, as discussed below. 
This does not mean that CBDC issuance should be carried out in a 
fragmented manner. The ESCB is the institutional architecture that 
maintains coordination and coherence in NCBs’ actions as steered by 
the ECB. The ECB’s leadership is required for a number of specific 
considerations below. 
First, the ECB must decide for what purpose the CBDC should be 
programmed. Should the CBDC be programmed for an alternative 
protocol infrastructure, so that the ESCB takes on the role of 
providing competing blockchain infrastructure in the dApp economy? 
This initiative could be similar to the state-backed blockchain protocol 
initiative in China,224 where an “official” infrastructure is offered 
alongside privately constructed ones. The benefit of such an 
infrastructure could be the implicit promise for maintenance and 
 
222. Bousfield, supra note 79. 
223. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 
Jurisdictions and their Comparative Regulatory Responses (as of May 2018), 1 
STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 41 (2018). 
224. See, e.g., Blockchain-based Service Network, available at 
https://bsnbase.io/g/main/index. 
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robustness underwritten by the public sector, and choice for 
entrepreneurs. It should also be considered whether such an 
innovation should be made open source and available for adoption or 
should result in proprietary rights subject to licensing for the ESCB. 
Making technological provision open source likely increases and 
encourages uptake although making it proprietary and subject to 
licensing may allow a regulatory channel to be constructed so as to 
select and supervise adopters and users. In the alternative, should the 
ESCB work with the private sector so that CBDC is programmed to be 
compatible with infrastructure protocol such as the Ethereum 
blockchain? This is arguably preferred as the Ethereum blockchain 
enjoys significant network effects for dApp enterprise development. 
Further, developing programmability of the CBDC with experienced 
private sector innovators may yield useful insights for technological 
learning for the public sector and public-private coordination for 
policy developments in the future. These decisions need to be decided 
at the level of the ESCB overall orchestrated under the ECB, and it 
would be beneficial for the ECB to take leadership in a unified form 
of engagement with the private sector. 
Policy centralization at the ECB level also arguably matches with 
the broader purpose of the CBDC, which pursuant to Article 127 of 
the TFEU, relates to the ECB’s support of general economic policies 
in the European Union with a view to contributing to the achievement 
of its objectives.225 This includes the Digital Single Market, which is 
intended to promote cross-border e-commerce and the Digital Finance 
Package226 supporting the single capital market.227 The limited rollout 
proposal does not offend the needs for institutional independence and 
stature.228 However, it paves the way for innovation in regulatory 
coordination and architecture, as the enabling institution of the CBDC 
lights the way for complementary policy development to support and 
govern the dApp economy. We turn to sketch out a blueprint for key 
 
225. TFEU, supra note 213, arts. 3, 127. 
226. Digital Finance Package, supra note 204 (outlining policy umbrella for 
the European Commission’s proposal to regulate cryptoassets). 
227. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154. 
228. See generally HAROLD JAMES, MAKING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY 
UNION (2012); Werner Bonefield, Ordoliberalism and Political Theology: On the 
Government of Stateless Money, in ORDOLIBERALISM, LAW AND THE RULE OF 
ECONOMICS (Josef Hien & Christian Joerges eds., 2017). 
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aspects of wider policy and regulatory thinking for mobilizing the 
dApp economy as a governed capitalist order.229 
C. A Brief Blueprint for the Regulatory Design and Architecture 
Implications for Supporting and Regulating the dApp Economy in the 
European Single Market 
The enabling role of the CBDC paves the way for regulatory 
rethinking of the implications for the scope and design of appropriate 
policy to address the needs of the dApp economy, and how regulatory 
architecture at the national and E.U. levels may be adjusted in 
response. In other words, the facilitative role of the CBDC paves the 
way for development of a regulatory capitalist order that engages with 
the roles of the public sector, in terms of providing regulatory 
governance, and the private sector, in relation to innovation and 
growth.  The role of the public sector can further involve issues 
surrounding the fitness of existing regulatory institutions, reform of 
substantive regulatory law, and the mandates of existing regulatory 
agencies. 
This Section discusses the contours of such implications in four 
respects: 
1. The rise of new intermediaries for facilitating investment 
in the dApp economy; 
2. The need for a complementary regime of ICO regulation, 
which need not be the same as fully-fledged securities 
regulation; 
3. The need to consider more broadly business and 
commercial policy for the dApp economy as business 
projects become live and economic activity in the dApp 
economy takes shape; and 
4. The need to consider how national central banks and 
relevant regulatory agencies may interact and coordinate 
to address the policy needs of the dApp economy, and how 
such interactions and coordination are further advanced 
through the E.U. institutional levels involving the ECB 
and relevant European agencies, such as the regulatory 
 
229. See IRIS H-Y CHIU, REGULATING THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY (Oxford: Hart, 
forthcoming 2022) (developing detailed proposals for regulating the dApp 
economy). 
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bodies in the European System for Financial 
Supervision.230 
1. The Rise of New Intermediaries for Facilitating Investment in the 
dApp Economy 
Under the limited rollout of CBDC proposal for investment into 
the dApp economy, a key new market player that would arise is the 
custodial agent for token-based CBDC. These custodial agents on the 
one hand serve bank-like functions but they are not banks because 
they are not envisaged to have full intermediation and money-creation 
functions.231 They would have duties and responsibilities to national 
central banks with whom they exchange investors’ cash for CBDC, to 
their customers, in terms of brokerage-like functions, and also to token 
issuers in relation to anti-money laundering due diligence and transfer 
functions. The existing industry of wallet services for cryptocurrency 
may be appropriate for developing such services, and many wallet 
services are provided by cryptocurrency exchanges.232  It would be 
important for policy-makers to engage with the private sector in order 
to understand current business models and to signal as to impending 
regulatory developments, and both the opportunities and compliance 
needs for service providers in this area. Regulatory obligations are 
already imposed under the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive,233 
but regulatory policy should be further tailored to specific risks of 
these services in relation to multi-way accountability to central banks, 
 
230. The System is comprised of the European Banking Authority, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, and a joint committee of the three to look at cross-
sectoral issues. See Regulation (EU) 1093/2010 (establishing the European Banking 
Authority). 
231. See generally PETER BOFINGER, MONETARY POLICY: GOALS, 
INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIES, AND INSTRUMENTS (2001) (discussing custodial agents 
for token-based CBDC). 
232. See generally Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing 
a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payment Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. 
ON REG. 295 (2015). 
233. See Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, art. 2. 
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token issuer regulators, and investors. In this manner, this Article 
argues that the European Commission’s proposal to regulate crypto-
asset service providers is too broad-brush as no meaningful distinction 
is made amongst many novel types of services arising in the crypto-
economy space. There are nevertheless useful aspects such as 
custodial duties akin to brokers,234 and customer due diligence 
standards akin to under the Payment Services Directive.235 
Further, it should be considered whether custodial agents may 
participate or diversify into investment services such as advisory 
services regarding the quality of token offers, and how those should be 
overseen. The Commission’s proposed regulation for service-
providers treats all manners of service providers in a group to be 
subject to similar prudential and conduct of business regulation. There 
is a need to consider how risks pertaining to different activities can be 
further understood for regulatory treatment. 
In light of the rise of secondary trading markets for tokens,236 the 
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (“IOSCO”) 
has proposed that regulators consider regulating these marketplaces in 
view of investor protection issues such as standards of trading, market 
abuse, and market transparency.237 The European Commission’s 
proposal reflects these, but these assumptions are made on the basis 
that trading exchanges are centralized in nature. Innovation in the 
crypto-economy and the arrival of decentralized exchanges238 may 
pose challenges to narrowly-defined regulatory categories. Regulatory 
capitalism in this space could be reflected by more intense 
engagement with private sector innovators and business developers, 
moving away from ontological assumptions with conventional 
financial service providers, so that regulatory policy can be 
 
234. See E.U. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2014), 
supra note 205, art. 16(8). 
235. E.U. Electronic Money Directive, supra note 167, art. 97 (relating to 
strong customer authentication). 
236. Such as Poloniex.com, Tokenmarket.net, and Idex.com. 
237. BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES 
COMMISSIONS, ISSUES, RISKS AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO 
CRYPTO-ASSET TRADING PLATFORMS (Feb. 2020), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD649.pdf. 
238. See, e.g., Uniswap, available at https://uniswap.org (facilitating liquidity 
pools). 
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dynamically informed. Further, new intermediaries facilitating 
investment into the dApp economy also include token rating services, 
which are currently unregulated.239 The extent of investor reliance on 
them should be subject to observation in considering if regulatory 
standards are needed. The operation of pan-European service 
provision by intermediaries in this space also gives rise to implications 
for intersections between national agencies for regulation and 
supervision or elevation of such supervision to the European agency 
level.240 
2. The Need for a Complementary Regime of ICO Regulation 
As proposed earlier in this Article, ICOs should be regulated 
differently from securities offerings as they are pre-development in 
nature,241  and raise different information asymmetry and investor 
protection risks. Although researchers have empirically observed that 
the quality of voluntary disclosure in ICOs, in the form of white 
papers, is sub-optimal in most cases, mandatory disclosure regulation 
under securities regulation may not be the appropriate regime for 
ICOs.242 
ICOs usually take place with perhaps no relevant track record for 
investors to observe, and the informational environment for investors 
may be unprecedentedly thin. This is not necessarily an issue of 
information asymmetry, i.e., that issuers have more information held 
to their chests than available to investors. This is an environment of 
information anemia as both issuers and investors are wading into a 
 
239. Such as ICObench.com and ICOratings.com. See Jongsub Lee, Tao Li & 
Donghwa Shin, The Wisdom of Crowds and Information Cascades in Fintech: 
Evidence from Initial Coin Offerings (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226051 (describing the 
usefulness and predictive power of ratings); Thomas Bourveau et al., Information 
Intermediaries in the Crypto-Tokens Market (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3193392. However, some 
commentators are of the view that the ratings services provide flawed ratings even 
for crypto-businesses that do not need to use a blockchain. See Chen Feng et al., 
Initial Coin Offerings, Blockchain Technology, and White Paper Disclosures (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256289. 
240. See infra Part III, Section C, subd. (4). 
241. Collomb, de Fillippi & Sok, supra note 91. 
242. Zetzsche et al., supra note 192. 
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speculative venture with much information to discover. Hence there 
may be a case for less reliance on extensive mandatory disclosure 
regulation, and to supplement with a regulatory regime that provides 
for more investor control so as to monitor the development of the 
project. 
There may be a case for regulatory design that facilitates post-sale 
investor monitoring. Post-sale monitoring is important as ICOs result 
in a frontloading phenomenon whereby dApp issuers get all of the 
proceeds for development before anything is started.243 Regulation 
can be aimed at mitigating developers’ agency risk, especially 
behavioral sub-optimalities associated with investment frontloading 
that exacerbates such risk, as well as to allow investors to observe the 
outworking of business viability and investment value risks. 
Regulatory design can include staged financing and escrow 
arrangements, which is proposed by Usha Rodrigues as similar to the 
kind of contractually agreed post-investment monitoring carried out in 
a venture capital investment in a start-up company.244 Such a 
regulatory design would involve different obligations from under 
securities regulation, and possibly new intermediaries with new 
obligations in relation to staged financing monitoring and custodial 
safeguarding of funds. 
Regulatory thinking for ICOs has developed in a rather siloed 
manner and in response to fears of regulatory arbitrage. For example 
in the United States, since the SEC’s investigative report that the 
initial coin offering made by the DAO was an unregistered securities 
offering,245  the “securities” definition could be applied in an 
extensive manner to ICOs. The SEC’s guidance246 has developed 
further to capture tokens with trading and appreciative characteristics 
even if these exist alongside functional or potentially functional 
characteristics (for projects under development).247 The more 
 
243. Xin Deng, Yen-Teik Lee & Zhengting Zhong, Decrypting Coin Winners: 
Disclosure Quality, Governance Mechanism and Team Networks (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247741 (discussing the 
frontloading phenomenon). 
244. See generally Usha R. Rodrigues, Financial Contracting with the Crowd, 
69 EMORY L.J. 397 (2019). 
245. SEC Report, supra note 193. 
246. Id. 
247. Rohr & Wright, supra note 88. 
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dominantly functional tokens are, in comparison to their tradeability 
or potential to provide gain as “financialize” items, the more likely 
they are not securities. A number of indicators are suggested by the 
SEC in order to determine if tokens are closer to the end of the 
financialized spectrum or the functional end, such as whether 
centralized efforts exist to develop the project and arrange for tokens 
to be traded, as opposed to ministerial functions for the blockchain 
system. It would also be relevant whether the token is offered more 
broadly (presumably to attract investment interest) or more narrowly 
to a targeted market interested in functionality. 
The SEC’s presumption of functionality versus financialization 
for characterizing tokens as securities can arguably be misplaced as 
tokens likely have both sets of characteristics. Financialization need 
not undercut the functional characteristics that exist in an asset, as we 
think about residential property as being both fully functional and 
financialized in many developed economies. Further, it seems unduly 
restrictive to prevent tokens from being successful both functionally 
and financially. In light of significant regulatory uncertainty for ICOs, 
developers have turned to new legal mechanisms, such as a Simple 
Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”)248 that provides a template 
for token offers to be made only to accredited investors in the United 
States, therefore exempting developers from having to register with 
the SEC as a public securities offer.249 The SEC’s approach is likely 
to funnel ICOs down “safe” exemptions in relation to small offers 
such as Regulation A or A+ or Regulation D250 for accredited 
investors. This may severely curtail retail participation. As dApp 
businesses are fundamentally peer-to-peer networks that provide 
opportunities for anyone to join in the enterprise efforts as well as 
 
248. See, e.g., The SAFT Project, supra note 197. 
249. See Regulation D Offerings, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
INVESTOR.GOV, available at https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/investing-basics/glossary/regulation-d-offerings. 
250. Id. See also Regulation A, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
SEC.GOV, available at https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/rega. 
Regulation A+ is the SEC’s implementation of Title IV of the JOBS Act. See Press 
Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate 
Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html. 
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financialized prospects,251 the prevention of retail participation in the 
name of retail investor protection ironically leads to the result of their 
marginalization from an innovative economic frontier. This may be 
contrary to the ethos and intentions of dApp developers. Further if 
developers are forced to fundraise in private markets, the 
demographics of the dApp economy can be radically shaped by 
involving largely financiers instead of economic actors from a diverse 
landscape. 
In the European Union, early mover Member States like Malta 
have taken a different approach to ICOs and treat tokens offered as 
suis generis financial products. This is also now reflected in the 
European Commission’s proposal.  In 2018, the Maltese Virtual 
Financial Assets Act 2018 was passed to provide a legitimate channel 
for ICOs to be legally offered in Malta. Virtual assets cover the scope 
of digital tokens that are not merely for consumption, payment, or are 
financial instrument falling within European legislation definitions. 
The Act requires an issuer of virtual assets to be a legal person in 
Malta, and a white paper with items of mandatory disclosure are to be 
filed and published. A summary that is in plain language and more 
narrative in nature should also be published for ease of use by retail 
investors. This mimics the E.U. securities regulation regime in the 
Prospectus Regulation252 and forms the same basis for the European 
Commission’s proposal to regulate crypto-assets.253 The Act provides 
for some general principles for the conduct of issuers, such as the 
management of conflicts of interest, conducting business with 
integrity, due care, skill and diligence and under proper control,254 
which have also found their way into the European Commission’s 
proposal. It is uncertain if these duties are ongoing in nature or apply 
to the point of marketing and sale of tokens to investors. These duties 
are also relatively open-ended and it is uncertain if any regulatory 
enforcement supports such duties. The Maltese regime perhaps relies 
 
251. Alyse Killeen, The Confluence of Bitcoin and the Global Sharing 
Economy, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA (David Lee Kuo Chuen ed. 2015). 
252. See Prospectus Regulation, supra note 208. 
253. European Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154. 
254. Malta Virtual Financial Assets Act § 9 (2018), cap. 590, available 
at  http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/Download Document.aspx?app=lom& 
itemid=12872&l=1. 
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more significantly on investment limits for investor protection. 
Investments in ICOs are limited to €5,000 per retail investor. 
Investment limits arguably allow the regulator to mitigate regulatory 
risk since investor losses are capped. This is close to the United 
Kingdom’s regulatory regime for equity crowdfunding, which limits 
retail investor outlay to 10 percent of net investible assets.255 Investor 
limits can be perceived as an investor protection measure that protects 
against consumer detriment, while reducing the need for too many 
regulatory standards to be imposed on issuers, or in the case of equity 
crowdfunding regulation, on platforms. Investors may also pursue 
civil liability for a white paper which contains untrue, misleading, 
inconsistent, and inaccurate statements.256 The Maltese Act requires 
an issuer to appoint a Virtual Financial agent that would be 
responsible for the anti-money laundering compliance side of fund-
raising, in relation to the standards of due diligence consistent with the 
European legislation on anti-money laundering. On the whole the 
Maltese regime, and arguably the Commission’s proposal, seem to 
offer a light version of the European Union’s “gold standards” for 
securities regulation. However, Malta’s regime for investor limits is 
not replicated in the Commission’s proposal. 
Unlike the Maltese regime that aims at investor protection by 
capping investment, the Commission’s approach is to import the 
consumer protection tenet of cooling-off rights by allowing for a 
mandatory 14-day period for withdrawal by investors. In comparison 
to the Maltese regime for disclosure and civil liability, the 
Commission’s proposal may be more onerous with more 
prescriptions. Nevertheless, the passport for making an offer 
throughout the European Union may be attractive to investors. 
However, it is uncertain if the Maltese and Commission’s recent 
templates, heavily derived from securities regulation, cohere with the 
needs of the blockchain-based community. First, if the “issuer” to be 
incorporated is the developer, the developer may not wish to be 
formalized as a company and be subject to a state’s company law 
rules. This is because in some dApp projects such as Filecoin257 and 
 
255. See FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, FCA HANDBOOK, COBS 4.7.10, 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/COBS/4/7.html [hereinafter FCA 
HANDBOOK]. 
256. Id. COBS 4.2. 
257. See Filecoin, supra note 116. 
67
Chiu: Central Bank Digital Currency for the Crypto-economy: An Experi-m
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2021
2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021  9:44 AM 
320 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
Decentraland,258  the developers envisage withdrawal from the project 
in due course as it becomes mature, so that the blockchain can be left 
entirely into the hands of the community of participants to operate and 
maintain. The need to incorporate and maintain ongoing compliance 
with company or securities rules may be disincentivizing. 
Next, if the tokens are to be offered over the blockchain platform, 
then would such a platform be regarded as the “legal entity” that needs 
to be duly registered or incorporated in any E.U. Member State, as 
required under the E.U. regime? How should a blockchain platform be 
treated in terms of legal organization? Blockchain systems are often 
regarded as peer-to-peer marketplaces and not legal persons such as 
corporations. The corporation is a hierarchical legal person and does 
not reflect relational realities in the blockchain system.  If there is 
indeed a regulatory lacuna in relation to the treatment of the 
community of participants that comprises the blockchain system, 
would such enterprises not be able to attain “legal entity” status, 
except perhaps in Malta, as only Malta offers a tailor-made legal 
organizational regime for blockchain platforms?259 If a blockchain 
platform were to forcibly be fit into an existing organizational 
category in a Member State, would token-holders have clarity in 
relation to the governance of the system and their rights? In a peer-to-
peer blockchain system, there is no ready ascertainment of the 
management organ. Would miners or core developers be regarded as 
taking on that role and the enormous responsibilities that normally 
attach to management?260 It remains unclear if token-holders are the 
equivalent of shareholders of incorporated companies and whether the 
rights, duties, and liabilities established in corporate law jurisprudence 
should apply. These questions are currently not answered by either the 
Commission nor Member States. 
Derivative regulatory approaches to regulating token offerings 
potentially miss the unique features of such fundraising and fail to 
meet their purposes. Changing regulators’ perspectives from a 
regulative focus to one that considers the enabling and mobilizing 
 
258. See Decentraland, supra note 110. 
259. See generally Malta Innovative Technological Arrangements and 
Services Act (2018), cap. 592, available at https://legislation.mt/eli/cap/592/eng/pdf. 
260. Angela Walch, In Cod(ers) We Trust, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: 
TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019). 
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aims for the dApp economy would entail a difference in approach 
toward regulatory policy—toward being more holistic and engaged 
with the new economic structures that are being revealed in the dApp 
economy. In this manner, the uniqueness of ICOs as pre-development 
funding can be recognized and policy-makers can consider a more 
bespoke regulatory regime, as outlined above. 
3. The Need to Consider More Broadly Business and Commercial 
Policy for the dApp Economy 
As dApp developers plan to develop blockchain-based networks 
into live businesses, these new businesses and their structures, as well 
as their commercial operations may raise questions in relation to 
regulatory arbitrage and institutional fit. In the sharing economy 
space, well-canvassed examples of regulatory arbitrage include Uber, 
which has resisted being categorized as a taxi service261 and as an 
employer of drivers who may indeed work full-time hours for Uber.262 
Prosumers on blockchain-based networks may avoid being regulated 
like business entities providing similar services, but may also not 
benefit from consumer protection.263 These regulatory lacunae need to 
be considered in relation to how standards and expectations may be 
safeguarded while allowing prosumers to engage in commercial 
freedoms and innovation. Such business and commercial regulatory 
policy is likely to span a number of sectors. In particular, financial 
regulators would need to consider how dApp businesses attempting to 
decentralize financial services such as in creating swaps, or providing 
lending should be treated in the “DeFi” space.264 This area is 
burgeoning with innovation and needs to be considered in relation to 
 
261. See generally Michèle Finck, Distinguishing Internet Platforms from 
Transport Services: Elite Taxi v. Uber Spain, 55 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1619 
(2018). 
262. See generally Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform 
Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARVARD L. & POL’Y REV. 480 (2016). 
263. See Florian Möslein, Conflicts of Laws and Codes: Defining the 
Boundaries of Digital Jurisdictions, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES (Philipp Hacker et al. eds., 2019); see also U.K. Consumer 
Rights Act 2015, §§ 49, 57, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/notes 
(may apply). 
264. Wulf A. Kaal, Digital Asset Markets Evolution (forthcoming, Journal of 
Corporation Law, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606663. 
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mitigating regulatory arbitrage265 while not discouraging useful 
disruptive innovation.266 
4. The Need to Consider Regulatory Intersections and Coordination at 
National and E.U. Levels 
The broader regulatory blueprint for the dApp economy would 
likely involve regulatory intersections and coordination at national 
levels and between national and E.U. levels. 
The intersection between national central banks and financial 
regulators such as securities regulators may not be unfamiliar, as euro 
area Member States with single regulators,267 or single regulators 
under the central bank’s auspices268 could look at constructing 
coordinative channels or organizing internally within the central bank 
such joined-up capacity. Member States with disparate regulators269 
with their own remits and turfs to maintain may face more challenges 
in terms of being path dependent. They may prefer to fit novel dApp 
economy issues into existing regulatory categories, such as how the 
United States with its disparate regulators have taken an approach of 
“coherentism”270 rather than regulatory reform towards the 
phenomena raised by the dApp economy.271 That said, in considering 
 
265. See Usha Rodrigues, Semi-Public Offerings? Pushing the Boundaries of 
Securities Law (U. Georgia School of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2018–30, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3242205. 
266. Joseph Bower & Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching 
the Wave, HARVARD BUS. REV. 43–53 (1995). 
267. Such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Latvia, and 
Poland. 
268. Such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, and Slovakia. 
269. Such as sectoral regulators between banking, insurance and 
investment/securities regulation, e.g., Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, 
The Netherlands, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, and Slovenia. 
270. See BROWNSWORD, supra note 183, at 191–196 (discussing 
“coherentism” as a regulatory mindset that seeks excessively to fit new 
developments into existing ontologies by default instead of considering the need for 
reform). 
271. See generally Chiu, supra note 198. See also M. Todd Henderson & Max 
Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Towards an Operational 
Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets (2019 Columbia 
Bus. L. Rev. 444, U. Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 858, U. 
70
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2021], Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss2/12
 2_Final_Updated_Master Copy_5.3.21_Chiu_Building Out the Crypto economy camera ready (Do Not Delete)6/23/2021  9:44 AM 
2021] CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY FOR THE CRYPTO-ECONOMY 323 
the innovative product of cryptocurrency exchange-traded funds, the 
SEC has now signaled willingness to work with other agencies, 
namely the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and the 
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission to explore how 
regulatory ontologies or even reform can be developed to cope with 
innovation that challenges existing regulatory boundaries.272 
European level agencies can be particularly well-placed to 
orchestrate high-level inter-agency linkages and coordination. The 
European System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”), which 
comprises the European Banking Authority (“EBA”), European 
Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”), European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), the Joint Committee of 
the agencies and the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”) 
constituted under the ECB, provides inter-agency linkages and 
opportunities for inter-agency learning, dialogue and coordination, 
and overcomes the apparently siloed appearance of each agency’s 
mandate.273 Although regulatory linkages are constructed for specific 
purposes, inter-agency coordination at the E.U. level and through to 
national level bodies, are not institutionally unfamiliar. Perhaps new 
inter-agency liaison structures extended from the Joint Committee of 
the ESFS can serve as a model for regulatory intersections and 
coordination involving E.U. level agencies and national level 
agencies. The Joint Committee currently addresses common 
objectives, such as anti-money laundering and consumer protection, 
both of which are relevant to the dApp economy. 
It may be queried whether the ECB and NCBs, which maintain a 
stature of independence for the ESCB’s mandates, should be engaged 
in such new policy and regulatory intersections and coordination. 
However, with the expansion of the ECB’s remit in the Banking 
Union, Otmar Issing, for example, opines that “serving the Union’s 
wider economic policies” provides a basis for institutional dynamism 
 
Chicago, Pub. L. Working Paper No. 683, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265295. 
272. Jackie Noblett, Cryptocurrency ETFs under active consideration, says 
SEC Chair, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9f2c1303-678e-486e-b3f1-d4f234f85f47. 
273. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Power and Accountability in the EU 
Financial Regulatory Architecture: Examining Inter-agency Relations, Agency 
Independence and Accountability, 8 EUROPEAN J. LEGAL STUD. 68 (2015). 
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for the ECB,274  as the ECB, though independently instituted for 
specific tasks, is not insular in nature from the wider institutional 
context for digital transformation in the Single Market,275 including 
the Digital Finance Package276 that supports the Capital Markets 
Union in the European Union.277 Further, the Banking Union has 
brought coordinative channels between the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the EBA.278 Further intersection with the ESFS would 
be optimal in order to address the enabling and regulative needs of the 
dApp economy. The ESCB and the ESFS can be connected for policy 
deliberation on dApp economy mobilization and regulation. This can 
also lead to new considerations such as whether new regulatory bodies 
may be needed, such as the new Maltese Digital Innovation Authority. 
The kind of interagency and multi-stakeholder approach adopted 
in the Digital Single Market strategy279 can also provide some 
inspiration for a way forward for organizing regulatory intersections 
and coordination for policy thinking about the dApp economy. 
Hazards can be sounded in terms of the inefficiencies of “too many 
cooks” and the lack of definite outcomes after protracted processes of 
 
274. Otmar Issing, The European Central Bank, in SVERIGES RIKSBANK AND 
THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING (Rodney Edvinsson, Tor Jacobson &Daniel 
Waldenström eds., 2018). 
275. See generally Bonefield, supra note 228. 
276. Orbach, supra note 201. 
277. See Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 76; European 
Commission Proposal 2020, supra note 154. 
278. See generally THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
(Gianni Lo Schiavo ed. 2019). For critical discussions of the relationship between 
the SSM and EBA, see Eilis Ferran & Valia Babis, The European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224538; Concetta Brescia 
Morra, From the Single Supervisory Mechanism to the Banking Union. The Role of 
the ECB and the EBA (2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448913; but see Guido 
Ferranini & Luigi Chiarella, Common Banking Supervision in the Eurozone: 
Strengths and Weaknesses (ECGI Working Paper, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309897 (positive discussions). 
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listening to every voice.280 Nevertheless, Finck’s vision of “co-
regulation”281 is arguably necessary due to the novelties and 
complexities posed by the new needs of the dApp economy. From 
national levels to European levels, regulatory linkages and capacity 
need to be considered, in terms of how harmonization or indeed 
appropriate decentralization can steer policy initiatives. Such 
coordinated regulation can pave the way for inspiring other 
jurisdictions with multifaceted regulatory architectures, such as in the 
United States, to consider reorganizing and regrouping architectural 
linkages in response to new economic dynamism. 
CONCLUSION 
The dApp economy is an innovative and exciting business space 
that is creating economic value despite the lack of regulatory 
institutions that support it so far. Indeed, regulatory proposals offered 
by the European Commission in relation to stablecoins and crypto-
asset offerings in the European Union may be too path dependent and 
fail to meet the innovative needs of the dApp economy. This Article 
proposes that regulation has a facilitative role to play in mobilizing 
this economic space and galvanizing its scaling up and interface with 
the conventional mainstream economy. The starting point of such a 
facilitative regulatory regime could lie in the issuance of a central 
bank digital currency that addresses the weaknesses of the monetary 
order in the dApp economy. The European Single Market is an apt 
place for the rollout of a central bank digital euro, based on the high 
levels of dApp activities in the European Union and its ability to 
support harmonized policies across borders within the Single Market. 
The issuance of a CBDC in the European Single Market can 
provide a departure point for the building out of the dApp economy by 
more enabling regulatory institutions, including more appropriate 
fundraising governance and other complementary policies for service 
providers and new intermediaries. Regulatory institutions, both of a 
facilitative and governing nature, are needed to support and mobilize 
new economic actorhood, service provision and social trust, and 
 
280. Staff, Europe’s digital single market: Incumbents rule – The European 
Union’s online reforms help the old more than the new, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 
2016), https://www.economist.com/business/2016/09/17/incumbents-rule. 
281. FINCK, supra note 2, at 171–180. 
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acceptance of developments in the dApp economy. Siloed regulative 
developments could be counterproductive without the holistic 
integration of an enabling institution for the dApp economy. 
Crucially, the enabling “starting point” argued for in this Article, i.e., 
the limited rollout of CBDC for investment in the dApp economy, 
would underpin substantive policy thinking and considerations 
regarding regulatory intersections and coordination at the levels of 
national and E.U. regulatory architecture. This is consistent with a co-
regulatory and multi-stakeholder approach to policy building pursued 
in the E.U. Digital Single Market Strategy. This experiment in the 
European Union is also likely to yield lessons for regional and 
international coordination, which is important for the global and 
borderless nature of the dApp economy. 
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